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The purpose of this thesis is to: (1) discuss and
evaluate the substance of post-1955 Austrian foreign policy;
(2) analyze the concept and applicability of military neu-
trality to the Austrian case; and, (3) assess the key ele-
ments within the policymaking apparatus. An analytical
treatment is used with occasional departures into historical
discussions. The following are also presented: the role of
special interest groups and political parties, coalition
practices, recent changes in the national community, and a
brief examination of foreign economic policies. The study
closes with a discussion of the country* s involvement in
world affairs.
Neutral Austria is portrayed as a viable and united
nation-state with the capacity to make significant contribu-
tions toward building a more stable order in Europe,
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The transition in Austria since the end of the Second
World War has bean in sharp contrast to that country's first
experience with parliamentary democracy. In 1955, aft.
^n years of foreign occupation, Austria received
independence from the former wartime Allies of the Second
World Jar.. Freed from the bitter political dissension which
contributed to the destruction of the First Austrian Repub-
lic, the Austrian nation immediately demonstrated in a
pattern of peaceful national elections that the new republic
was viable and worthy of membership in the world community
of nations.
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem
It was the purpose of this study (1) to discuss and
analyze post-1955 Austrian foreign policy, as it has hoen
expounded and implemented} (2) to show how neutrality has
conditioned the role of the country in international
affairs; (3) to compare and assess the importance of various
elements within the organisation concerned with foreign
policy-making; and (4) to present Austria's involvement in








2Importance of the study
The existence of a uniteil Austrian state in 1955 was
the result of both luck and coura'/ It was fortunate that
the Renner Provisional Government was jointly recognised by
the Western Allies and the Soviet Union in 1945, thereby
preventing the continuing tension that has existed in
divided Germany, Second, it was significant that the Second
Austri.m Republic was not absorbed into the Soviet sphere of
influence. The failure of the threats and blandishments of
the Soviet Government to cause in Austria a repetition of
events that brought about the downfall of non-Communist
governments in other Central and Eastern European countries
was, among other reasons, cue to the courage of the Austrian
people.
This study was undertaken In view of Austria»s geo-
graphical position, potential contributions to the creation
of a more stable order in Europe, and because of the afox
mentioned early postwar history, Austria is loca
of the crossroads of Suropv e a wedge thrust into
Communist-dorainat -istern 3urope, Austria is boun n
the north by Czechoslovakia, on the east by Hungary, on the
south by Yugoslavia and Italy, on I . .est by Switserlan
i
and on the northwest by Germany. Its area is 32,376 cqua




3miles, and the frontiers total 1,638 miles . Further, Austria
lies only a few hundred miles from the territory of the
Soviet Union,
Since no published studies on the contemporary
Austrian foreign policy process have been introduced in the
United States to date, it is hoped that this thesis has
filled a gap that had been previously ignored.
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Political Process
In opening any discussion on politics, it was S-
sary t -_ne the terminology which was used as the frame-
work of the study. Although the Austrian "political
process" cannot be defined precisely, it shall be considered
in this presentation in the following context:
Politics consists of the organizational activity men
engage in to maximize their deeply felt convictions
about social values. By political action men attei
to realize their differing notions of "public good."
Thus politics is really a process-—a means to a value-
centered end*^
The extent of cooperation in the contemporary coalition
government became one clear illustration of how far
and Public Opinion in Austria (Washington: The American
x3nTversity, 1954), p. 2.
2Charles 0. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Cot-
of Internet j-onal Politics (Snglewood Cliffs, New Jersey:








4politicians have compromised their principles to promote
domestic tranquillity and the public good.
Foreign Policy
It was equally important to determine what was meant
by "foreign policy" since the theme of this thesis was cen-
tered around its process of formulation and implementation.
Charles 0. Lerche and Abdul A. Said, in Concepts of Inter-
national Politics , defined this phrase
:
In a broad sense, foreign policy consists of a socie-
ty's attempt to realize on the international plane
certain notions of what it conceives as good*
J
An examination of value judgments, or what the Austrian
nation considered to be good, and how these value judgments
stimulated political action was thus required. The foreign
policy process was found subjected to all the pressur
which exist in any state's internal political process.
Austrian foreign policy has successfully functioned in an
environment of competition j not in a vacuum or in a world
that the policy-makers wished existed.
National Interest
oreign policy was defined above in terms of what
society considered to be good. These value judgments form












politics." Since foreign policy is formulated in the real
world, these value judgments must be translated by policy-
5
makers "into objectives before they can begin to act*" The
focal concept involved here was that of the "national
interest." This shall be considered as "the general, long-
term, and continuing purpose which the state, the nation,
6
and the government all see themselves as serving."
III. PROCEDURE AND SOURCES
Procedure
An analytical treatment was used with occasional
departures into historical and descriptive discussions. The
historical section's purpose was to identify the main fac-
tors which have determined the role of Austria in inter-
national affairs.
Sources
The explanation for the preponderance of secondary
material in the bibliography was due to the collection of
all information in the United States. The majority of
studies on Austria covered either thi. ~od of the Allied
postwar occupation or the experiences of the First Austrian
4Ibid ., p. 4.
5Ibid






6Republic* The Austrian Information , a biweekly bulletin
published in the English language by the Austrian Press and
Information Service, was utilized to a large extent for more
current information. It carried important statements by
Austrian statesmen as well as reprints from Austrian news-
papers* Official statements by key government officials,
especially the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Fiinister, pro-
vided insight into the substance of Austria's foreign policy.
*
«jt*t 1?|ttI1iMW BhtUlWf ****
CHAPTER II
ORIGINS OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC
In Austria, as in all countries, the making of for-
eign policy and its process of execution was influenced by
the legacy of the past. This legacy helped influence the
nation's image of what foreign policy was and what it could
be* Memories of the past have fashioned expectations which,
in turn, have affected the interplay between foreign policy
and the continuous process of national self-definition and
interpretation of national interests. In the first fifty-
five years of the twentieth century, the history of Austria
was turbulent. The purpose of this chapter was to identify
the main events that have conditioned the contemporary role
of Austria in world affairs,
I. FIRST AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC 1918-1938
Internal Weakness
The disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire in 1918
left the First Republic in a precarious economic and finan-
cial position. All that remained with which to build the
First Austrian Republic was about seven million German-
speaking Austrians and a group of nine provinces without

8national or administrative cohesion. The economic geogra-
phy of the dissolved empire revealed the presence of two
very different spheres in Austria. In the east lay indus-
trial Vienna, and from it toward the south extended a number
of industrial cities. The rest of the country was agrarian,
except for a few scattered cities. Once the central admin-
istration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was removed, the
balance of power within the country shifted from Vienna to
the rural provinces.
Charles A. Gulick, in Austria , From Hapsburg to
Hitler, summarized the serious problem of a lack of national
consciousness
:
Vorarlberg wanted union with Switzerland, Tirol
wished independence, and the majority of the states
desired to obtain the greatest possible freedom
from Vienna and the central government.
2
The diversity between the industrial and agrarian sectors of
the population demanded collaboration between the two politi-
cal forces. Instead, patriotism was subordinated to party
sentiments. Mary HacDonald, in The Republic of Austria 1918*
1934, concluded that:
Richard Kiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (London:
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 1.
2Charles A. Gulick, Austria , From Hapsburg to Hitler
^rkeley, California: University of California Press,
1948), Vol. 1, p. 121.








This lack, more than any other single cause, was to
prove the ultimate ending of the Austrian Republic
• • • •
Under these conditions, the concept of a unified state was
meaningless*
Despite treaty prohibitions, agitation for union with
Germany went on steadily in Austria from 1919 to 1926. The
significance of this movement justified a quotation of some
length
:
When it became clear that the Bolshevist danger in
Germany was rapidly waning the hopes of the separatist
movement turned more and more definitely toward
Germany. Especially when, after the Kapp putsch in
Germany, rightist rule was established in Bavaria by
Kahr, the tendencies toward union with that part of
the Reich reached a climax in the states. Sven
earlier, December 1919, Tirol and Salzburg had carried
unanimous resolutions favoring "economic anschluss* to
Germany • • • • The Sntente, however, declared, by
means of a very positive note of December 17, 1919,
written by Clemenceau, that it would not tolerate any
changes in the territorial or other stipulations of
the peace treaty ....
The first Habsburg putsch in Hungary gave a new
impetus to the anschluss movement • ... In April,
1921, Tirol carried through a plebiscite on anschluss.
Almost nine-tenths of the qualified voters partici-
pated and 98.8 per cent of them favored anschluss.
Next, the diet of Salsburg passed a similar resolution.
... Although Upper Austria also decided to have an
election, it was pointed out that the decision was to
be regarded only as an expression of principle.
nally, Styria followed, on Kay 31 the diet there
3Hary HacDonald, The Republic of Austria 1918-1934 ,
A Study in the Failure of Democratic Government Ttondon
:






decided upon a plebiscite* la the meanti, ance,
supported by England and Italy, made it clear to the
government in Vienna that a continuation of the
plebiscites in the states would lead to immediate
refusal of any credit* Since at that time of raging
inflation in Austria the whole policy of the govern-
ment was dominated by the need of foreign credits,
this intervention of the Entente was decisive*
4
Life in the new Republic was extremely difficult
during the first few years. Terrible economic distress
fostered the growth of extremist elements on both sides,
thus serving to accentuate the already existing class and
5party differences previously mentioned* Joseph 3. ftoucek,
*** Contemporary Europe , A Study of National , International ,
Economic , and Cultural Trends , outlined the nature of the
economic challenges
In the first nine years after the wax Austria strug-
gled with five financial problems; (1) an adverse
foreign trade balance, (2) unemployment, (3) currency
disorganization, (4) unbalanced budgets, and (5 5
shortage of operating capital•&
The Austrian Government was unable to solve these problems
alone and requested foreign assistant
Allied Assistance
In February, 1922, credits were advanced to Austria
"'Gulick, op « cit . , pp. 121-122.






by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. De-
spite these loans, the financial situation remained chaotic
and on September 6, Chancellor Seipel appeared before the
Council of the League of Nations to appeal for additional
help. It should be noted that Austria had accepted member-
ship in the League of Nations on December 15, 1920. Conse-
quently, on October 4, 1922, the three so-called Geneva
Protocols were signed. The Protocols provided financial
assistance as requested under a Commissioner-General and a
Committee of the Guaranteeing Governments—Great Britain,
France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Proto-
cols contained a guarantee of Austria* s independence by the
League of Nations. As a tangible result, the budget was
balanced for the first time in 1925.
Mary MacDonald drew the conclusion that during this
period
:
The absolute dependence of Austria on economic assist-
ance from the Allies necessitated the adoption of a
foreign policy which was unpopular with the majority
of Austrians; and the control acquired over the coun-
try by her creditors gave birth to the suspicion that
government by the people for the people was synonymous
with government by the Allies for the Allies.''
Although Allied objections to any territorial changes of the
peace treaty had prevented anschluss with Germany during the
7MacDonald, o£. cit




early period of the Austrian Republic, the issue reappeared
in the next decade*
Customs Union Project
After a few years of relative prosperity in the mid-
dle 'twenties, economic difficulties returned to Austria as
the effects of the world-wide depression following 1929
became manifest. Since the Austrian economy was founded on
foreign loans which were no longer available, Austria again
sought assistance and new loan commitments. Finally, to
counteract domestic economic straits, on March 19, 1931, the
German and Austrian governments signed a protocol paving the
way for a customs union.
The French, Italian, and Chechoslovakian governments
registered immediate protests against this form of economic
anschluss. This action was based <^n the joint belief that
such an arrangement endangered Austrian independence. The
project was submitted to the League of Nations, but was
ultimately abandoned by the Austrian government. In October
1931, the International Court at The Hague declared that the
proposed union was illegal, by the margin of a single vote.
In the meantime, a financial crisis occurred in
Austria. The climax caste when the Austrian Credit-Anstalt
,
largest banking institution in Central Europe, suspended





institution in Austria which could take over the bankrupt
Credit-Anstalt. The government appealed for loans, but
French action obstructed foreign action. The collapse of
the German banking system in July 1931 immensely increased
-
the strain on the Austrian economy
.
ch the renunciation of the customs union project,
loans became available and the economy was revived tempo-
rarily. The final episode in this ill-starred undertaking
occurred in October 1931, when the International Court at
The Hague declared the scheme illegal by a narrow majority.
Meanwhile, domestic politics were characterized by the ever-
widening schism between the Christian Socialists and the
Social Democrats. The Austrian National Socialist Party,
.ng other extremist groups, took full advantage of na-
tional disunity.
National-Socialist Germany
By 1932, the Austrian Nazi Party had emerged as a
strong contender in Austrian politics, coinciding with the
rise of the German National Socialist Party. The Landbund
and the German Nationalist parties, along with a faction of
the pro-Fascist Heimwehr, were absorbed into the Nazi move-






of the democracy through continued agitation for anschluss
and violent measures against their political foes. This
movement was immeasurably strengthened after Hitler came to
power in Germany. One of Hitler* s initial foreign policy
moves was the launching of a vigorous propaganda campaign
against the Austrian Government, This German program was
one clear indication of the beginning of the imd for the
Austrian Republic. As Charles A. Gulick put it:
The annexation of Austria by Germany was inevitable
after Hitler *s accession to power on January 30,
1933, unless the victors of 1918 had been willing to
stop him, by arms if necessary.
9
Civil War
As described above, the Austrian nation was bitterly
divided in 1932. Following great gains made by the Nazis in
the 1932 provincial elections, peasant leaders and more
moderate members of the Christian Socialists turned to Dr*
Sngelbert Dollfuss, who formed the last parliamentary govern-
ment on May 30, 1932. Mary KacDonald expresses the challenge
that the new Chancellor faced:
Or. Dollfuss did succeed in evoking, for the first
time, the faint beginnings of an Austrian national
consciousness. But his Government was too weak to
withstand simultaneous attacks from the Left and
from the Right. After having dissolved a parliament
which had become unworkable in March 1933, he found










terms with either the Social Democrats or with the
Heirr.vehr, now powerfully supported by Italy. He
chose the latter course .*0
Encouraged by Mussolini, Bollfuss pursued a course which led
to the crushing of the Social Democratic movement in
February 1934, and the end of the Austrian experiment in
11democratic government.
Corporative State
Dollfuss took a series of drastic steps in implement-
ing his policy of abolishing the party system, VImum
included the proscription of the Communist Party, the foun-
dation of the Fatherland Front, and the prohibition of all
activities of the National Socialists in 1S33, and the pro-
hibition of the Social Democratic Party on February 12,
121934. With the final submergence of the parliamentary
system, Dollfuss ruled by arbitrary decree. In accordance
with the Constitutional Law of Kay 1, 1934, a federal state
along corporative, Fascist lines was established.
In a step to check the influence of Naai Germany
,
Austria joined the Italo-Kungarian collaboration on March
NacQonald, o£. cit . , p. 12.
1XIbld .







17, 1934, according to the terms of the Rome Protocols.
Nevertheless, with the elimination of the Social Democrats
the basis of Dollfuss* position became so unstable that the
Austrian Nazis on July 25 attempted a putsch, Dollfuss was
assassinated during that unsuccessful upheaval. This event
nearly brought about an European conflagration. To prevent
any German move to capitalize on the chaotic situation,
Mussolini ordered Italian troops to be massed at the Brenner
Pass. When no armed action followed, the incident passed
peacefully, and one of Dollfuss 1 associates, Kurt von
Schuschnigg, became the new Chancellor*
Growth of Nazi Pressure
.!«.. m n. ii m m m i i i i n i
Nazi pressure on the Austrian Government increased
with the appointment of Von Papen as Ambassador to Austria,
on the day after Dollfuss* murder* An important factor in
this increasing pressure was the involvement of Italy in a
war of conquest against Abyssinia* Mussolini, weakened by
the Abyssinian War and defeats in the Spanish civil war, was
no longer strong enough to support Austria against the
mounting demands of Hitler* An agreement between Italy and
13
*"Two years later, March 23, 1936, three brief supple-
mentary protocols were signed* The most significant was t)
second* It announced that "the thr vernments reconfi
their decision to undertake no negotiations of political
significance without informing theix two co-signers





Germany, which gave birth to the Rome-3erlin Axis, was con-
cluded in late 1936 and freed Hitler to proceed against the
Austrian authorities.
In the meantime, Schuschnigg had recognized the threat
of Nazi Germany, When the Germans reoccupied the Rhineland,
Schuschnigg opened negotiations with Germany to lessen ten-
sions between the two governments. The result of extensive
negotiations was the announcement by Hitler and Schuschnigg
that on July 11, 1936, a treaty had heen concluded between
Austria and Germany* The significance of this document can
be seen in a partial extract of the text:
1. In the sense of the declarations of the Fuhrer
. „ * of May 21, 1935, the German Reich government
recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State
Austri
:
2. Each of the two governments considers the in—
-Tial political structure exist ,n in the other
country, including the question of Austrian National
Socialism, as an internal affair of the other coun-
try . . o o
3. The policy of the Austrian federal government,
in general and toward the German Reich in particular,
will always be based on principles which correspond
to the fact that Austria professes herself to be a
German state. Hereby the Protocols of Rome of 1934
and their supplements of 1936 as well as the rela-
tions of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners
to these protocols are not affected.^
Although the German position seemed tolerant, there were
secret clauses in the treaty which increased the peril of
anschluss. William L. Shirer, in The Rise and Fall of the
i




Third Reich, made the following assessment of the Austrian
concessions
:
He [Schuschnigg ] agreed secretly to amnesty Nazi
political prisoners in Austria and to appoint
representatives of the "so-called 'National
Opposition"' - a euphemism for Nazis or Nasi
sympathizers - to positions of "political respon-
sibility." This was the equivalent to allowing
Hitler to set up a Trojan horse in Austria. 15
In effect, this was what occurred less than two years
later. As Nazi propaganda in Austria was threatening to
precipitate civil war, Schuschnigg was invited to meet with
Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Here the Chancellor was handed an
ultimatum on February 12, 1933, demanding concessions for
Nazis in Austria; the alternative being invasion. Schusch-
nigg accepted the German terms on the next day; and Sayss-
Inquart, an Austrian Nazi, and other party members were
sworn into the Austrian Cabinet on February 15. Austrian
Nazis officially entered the Fatherland Front with the right
of free activity. Schuschnigg, however, was still convinced
that the independence of Austria was of vital interest to
Italy and that the past declarations of France and Great
Britain still stood. Thus, he chose to hold a plebiscite,
which was fixed for March 13.
1 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich , A History of Nazi Germany (New Yorlc : Simon and
Schuster, i960), p. £'§'£.
16See the account of this period in Gulick , op. cit
•
,
Vol. II, pp. 1781-1353.






Hitler, no longer deterred by Italy, responded with a
second ultimatum on March 11, in which the resignation of
Schuschnigg was demanded. Schuschnigg complied with this
threat on that same day and was immediately succeeded by
Seyss-Inquart. The latter asked for German assistance and,
on Harch 12, German forces entered Austria largely unopposed,
In summary, as Charles A. Gulick put it:
By cultivating native Fascism, by appeasing Nazis,
and by crushing "premature M anti-fascists it [the
Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime! helped to fashion the
Trojan Horse. 17
II. HAZI OCCUPATION 1938-1945
Th& final act in this long chain of events occurred on
March 13, when Austria became a part of the Third Reich. On
the next day, t: '.-naan Ambassador in the United States
transmitted a note to the Department of State notifying the
American Government of the Reich law of March 13, 1938.
Though Great Britain and France protested to Germany, their
action was too little, too late. Seven years of Nasi con-
trol followed, marking the dismal end of the First Austrian
j^£id* 9 P* 1358.
ISFor the text, see Green H. Hackworth, Digest of
International Law , United States department of State PuKl lo-








Republic, together with total loss of political rights and
total economic exploitation.
Allied Concern
In November 1943, at the fioscow Meeting of Foreign
Ministers, the governments of the united States, Great
Britain, Soviet Union, and later Prance, pledged in the
Moscow Declaration to re-establish a free and independent
19Austria. The Allies augmented this declaration at the
Yalta Conference by agreeing to promulgate the reinstatement
of sovereign rights as well as self-government for all
people deprived of such rights by aggressor nations. To
this end, the Yalta Declaration obligated them jointly to
assist
... the people in any of these states [Austria 3 to
regain conditions of internal peace and to form
interim representative and democratic governments,
pledged to the earliest possible establishment through
free elections of governments responsive to the will
of the people, 2"
Later, on April 8, 1945, the Soviet Government published
this statement:
1 "For the text, see William L. Stearman, The Soviet
Union and the Occupation of Austria ( Bonn : Siegler and
Company, i3!>?)
, p. 12.
20Herbert Feis, Churchill , Roosevelt . Stalin : The
War They Waged and the Peace THey Sought TPrinceton: Prince-




The Soviet Government is not pursuing the aim of
acquiring any part of Austrian territory or of
changing the social structure of Austria. It is
maintaining the point of view of the Moscow dec-
laration by the Allied Powers concerning the
independence of Austria . * . • It will contribute
to the liquidation of the regime of the German
ascist invaders and to the establishment in
Austria of a democratic order and institutions. 2*
With this background, an examination of the Allied occupa-
tion was next undertaken, which proved that Soviet action
did not coincide with the above statement.
III. THE POSTWAR OCCUPATION 1945-1955
Provisional Government
Immediately following Austria's liberation by Allied
forces, a Provisional Government under the leadership of
Socialist Karl Renner proclaimed the Second Republic of
Austria on April 27, 1945. The Soviet Army, having occupied
Vienna and eastern Austria, recognized Dr. Renner on the
assumption that he would become a Soviet puppet. However,
Or. Renner showed that he was not a puppet, and the Austrian
Socialist Party, emerging from eleven years of persecution,





Roucek, op . cit.
,
p. 312.
22Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Halenkov (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, ls*53), p. "55*3.
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The first legislative acts of this temporary govern-
ment were concerned with the framework of the constitution,
the re-establishment of the legal system, and the appoint-
ment of government officials. Franz Heissenberger, in The
Economic Reconstruction of Austria t 1945-1952 , described
this early efforts
On the strength of the "Yerfassungstiberleitungsgesetz"
(the law to reestablish Austrian enactments for German
ones), Austria was fundamentally reestablished as a
democratic republic, reverting to the provisions of
the Federal Constitution of 1920, as amended in 1929. 23
The frontiers of the country remained those established by
the Peace Treaty of 1919.
A Control Council Agreement of July 5, 1945, deter-
mined the relations between the occupying powers. Following
the arrangement agreed upon, Austria was divided into four
occupation zones on July 9, 1945, on somewhat th& same pat-
tern as Germany. There was one important distinction,
however, between the occupation imposed upon the two states.
The expressed purpose of the occupation of Austria was to
23Franz Heissenberger, The Economic Reconstruction of
Austria , 1945-1952, A Report on Eos'twar Pavel .right's""'
(Washington? Li rary of Congress, 1953), p. 18.
The zones of occupation were as follows i Russian-
Lower Austria, Burgenland, and the agricultural part of
Upper Austria; Sritish-Styria and Carthiniaj American-
Industrial part of Upper Austria and Salzburg; and the
French-Tyrol and Vorarlberg. The basis of the division
Upper Austria was apparently the Soviet intention of con-
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maintain control only to permit the establishment of a rep-
resentative and democratic Austrian Government which would
25have full authority throughout the whole of the country.
Subsequently, on August 23, the supreme occupation
and control authority became the Allied Commission for
Austria, This consisted of an Allied Council in Vienna, an
executive committee, and staffs appointed by the four
governments concerned. The primary tasks of the Allied
Council for Austria were to achieve the separation of
Austria from Germany; to secure the establishment of a cen-
tral Austrian administrative machinery; to prepare the way
for an elected Austrian Government; and to provide an effec-
tive administration in the meantime.
On October 20, 1945, the Renner Government was recog-
nized by the Allied Occupying Powers on the condition that a
2 r igeneral election be held before the end of the year. The
national election was duly conducted on November 25 without
any duress, and the provisional government resigned three
25United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Relations , Special Study Mission to Poland and Austria , 87tt
Congress, 2d
yWidnTfohlngfcon:~GovernmenT"Printing
Office, 1962), p. 16.
26See the account of this early postwar period in
Gordo:* Shepherd . The Austrian Odyssey (London: Macmillan and
Company, Ltd., 195^), pp. 172-1&2. t a discussion on rec-
ognition, see William l". Stearman, The Soviet Union and the
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days later in favor the new government • The Political
Cabinet Council accepted its resignation and called on the
Austrian People's Party to nominate someone to form the
27government.
Coalition Government
On December 3, 1945, a committee of newly-electe
members of Parliament selected Or, Leopold Figl, as Chancel-
lor, Along with Vice Chancellor Adolf Schaerf , a Socialist,
the Chancellor formed the first coalition government, which
the Allied Council approved on December 18. On _>er 20,
the two Houses of Parliament met in joint session tn th
a vote of 204 out of 205, elected ex-Chancellor Renner as
the first President. The new President's first official
function was to swear in the members of the new government.
The powers of the Government and Parliament were
defined by quadripartite agreement in 1946. The Occupying
Powers agreed, on June 28, 1946, to a new control . ement
which substantially enlarged the authority of the Austrian
Government. All laws enacted by the government, with th«
exception of constitutional provisions and international
agreements, now became effective after thirty-one days
21This body, in addition to acting as an inner Cabi-
net, temporarily formed the supreme executive authority ^
carried out the duties previously performed by the President,





unless disapproved by the Allied Council. As the veto had
to be unanimous, this rule ensured that the majority of laws
became effective, even if they met with Soviet opposition.
The power of the government was further expanded in December,
when the Occupying Powers authorized it to conclude trade




Austria achieved political and economic stability in
a relatively short time, although serious economic difficul-
29ties associated with reconstruction remained. In : '
the food supply was inadequate in the early postwar period
with the bulk of imports consisting of foreign relief con-
signments. On July 2, 194 7, the Austrian Government sub-
mitted an application for membership in the United Nations.
This request was rejected by the Soviet Union in the Se-
curity Council, and continued Soviet opposition kept Austria
out of the world organization for another eight years. In
the meantime, Austria was able to join the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations and by 1952 had become a
member of all the agencies except one.
28Hans Kohn, The Future of Austria (New York: For-
eign Policy Association, 1955), p. 16,
29For further details, see infra, pp. 141-143.
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An Austrian delegation attended the European Confer-
ence in Paris from July 12 to September 23, 1947, at which
the broad principles of European cooperation for reconstruc-
tion were promulgated. Thereafter, with Marshall Plan funds
for capital investments, significant progress was made in
nearly every sector of the economy during the process of
rebuilding. After a comprehensive currency reform in Novem-
ber, the economy revived, and the way was opened for future
prosperity and social advance.
Despite the enormous property destruction and great
loss of life, the new Austrian state had undergone a trans-
formation which permitted it to meet the serious challenges
ahead. The nation had achieved two clear advan.ages that
they had lacked between the wars: clear common objectives
and a faith in Austria. Union with Germany and federation
with the neighboring Balkan states, both prewar suggest!
for change, were no longer demanded. Instead, Austrian©
wanted a country of their own. This patriotic spirit







During the decade of Allied occupation, t'ne Soviets













progressively exploited their zone in Lower Austria. Under
the Potsdam Agreements, the Soviets were given control of
all German assets in their zone* These included plants
which constituted about 30 per cent of industry in the
Soviet Zone and 10 per cent of the total Austrian industry,
oil resources which accounted for 95 per cent of the coun-
try^ oil production, and refineries which accounted for
about 80 per cent of the refinery capacity in Austria.
Drive for Independence
The Austrian Government pressed the Allies for t
years for the signin i State Treaty. During thi t-
ing period, Austria remai mainstream
international politics. William H. Hale, in an article in
Reporter , concluded that "Austria benefited from a stability
22from weakness, since the state was too small to divide."
As Austria was involved in the Second World as an
integral part of the Third Reich, no peace treaty was r
quired since a declared state of war had nev
between Austria and the Allied nations. However, a Stat
Treaty was necessary to specify tl- ondi- under which
Austria could regain her sovereignty. Tine Allied Fowc
31United States Congress, House, op . cit • » p. 16.
32
Williara H. Hale, "Political Reunion in the Vienna




held nearly four hundred meetings at various levels on this
issue between 1947 and 1955. The Western Powers made every
effort to conclude the treaty, but the Soviets, time after
time, found new and irrelevant excuses for refusing agree-
33
roento
In 1952 the United Nations General Assembly discussed
the Austrian matter, A resolution calling upon the Four
Powers to terminate the occupation was adopted on December
20, 1952, The Soviet Government chose to ignore this resolu-
tion, and the issue remained stalemated.
State Treaty
In February 1955, the Soviets suddenly altered their
established policy toward an Austrian settlement. On
February 8, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov delivered a for-
eign policy speech in which he stated that if the Austrian
State Treaty was signed, Allied troops could be withdrawn
before the German Peace Treaty was signed provided there
34
were sufficient guarantees against another Anschluss. The
Foreign Minister also called for another Four Power
33John F. Dulles, Hearing before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84U» Congress, 1st
Session on executive G, "Thm State Treaty for the ^estab-
lishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, signed at
Vienna, on Kay 15, 1955," June 10, 1955, p. 2.
34Stearman, op . cit . , p. 143.
ttB
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Conference to discuss the German issue and the Austrian
State Treaty and pointed out the dangers to Austria which
would accompany the ratification of the Faris agreements
•
This policy reversal coincided with the Western
European parliamentary actions which assured the coming into
force of the Paris Accords for restoring sovereignty to the
Federal Republic of Germany, creating the Western European
Union, and bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into the
35North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This address was fol-
lowed by several meetings on February 25 and March 2 between
Molotov and the Austrian Ambassador Bischoff • As way of a
response, Austria replied in a note dated March 14, 1955,
that the Austrian Government welcomed every guarantee for
its independence, and indicated a willingness to discuss
these points before a general conference on the State Treaty
was held*
On March 24, Molotov informed Ambassador Bischoff
that the Soviet Government acquiesced in principle to the
Austrian suggestion and invited Austrian representatives to
come to Moscow to discuss the State Treaty. The Austrian
Government accepted this invitation and later received
Western approval for this bilateral meeting. The Austrian
delegation, which included Chancellor Raab and Foreign
Dulles, op . cit .. p. 2.
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Minister Figl from the People's Party, Vice Chancellor
Schaerf and State Secretary for foreign Affairs Kreisky from
the Socialist Party, arrived in the Soviet capital on April
11.
Discussions began on the next day and were concluded
with the signing of a Memorandum on April 15* In this
accord, the two delegations came to an undertstanding bind-
ing the Austrian delegation to carry out the following
decisions and measures:
1. Referring to the declaration made at the confer-
ence of Berlin in 1954 neither to join in a military
alliance nor to allow foreign military bases in its
territory, the Austrian Government will make a dec-
laration in a form which will obligate Austria inter-
nationally to practice in perpetuity a neutrality of
the type maintained by Switzerland. 2. After having
ratified the State Treaty, the Austrian Government
will submit this declaration to the Austrian Parlia-
ment for confirmation according to the Constitution.
3. The Austrian Government will take all suitable
steps to obtain international recognition of this
declaration. 4. The Austrian Government will wel-
come a guaranty by the four Powers of the independenc
and territorial integrity of Austria. 5. The
Austrian Government will seek to obtain from the
governments of France, Great Britain, and the United
States of America such a guaranty. 36
On April 19, the Soviet Government, in identical
notes to the three Western Powers, proposed that the four
Foreign Ministers meet in Vienna with Austrian
r
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Hearings, 34& Congress, 1st Session, on Executive






representatives to discuss and sign the State Treaty* On
April 22, the Western Powers agreed to the aforementioned
meeting. History was made with the signing of the treaty on
the morning of May 15, 1955; and after seventeen years of
foreign occupation, Austria was proclaimed independent*
There were eight principal provisions in the State
37
Treaty. First, Austria was re-established as a sovereign,
independent, and democratic state* The Four Powers declared
their intention to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of Austria within the former frontiers as of
January 1, 1938* A joint statement was also made to incor-
porate into the future German Peace Treaty provisions for
securing from Germany the recognition of Austrian sover-
eignty* Political or economic union between Austria and
Germany was prohibited. In return for approximately three
hundred factories and other former German assets, Austria
agreed to pay the Soviet Union £150 million in goods over a
six-year period. The Soviet Union handed back the Danube
Navigation Company for a payment of $2 million* The Soviets
further agreed to return Austrian oilfields held in exchange
for ten million tons of crude oil to be delivered over a
37For the text, see United States Department of State,
United States Treaties and other International Agreements ,
#3298 , Vol. 6, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing
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period of ten years. Under the Austro-Soviet agreement con-
cluded in July 1960, oil deliveries after July 19S1 were
reduced and the final year»s delivery eliminated. Finally,
the Hapsburgs were barred from the Austrian throne.
Allied Withdrawal
The State Treaty came into force on July 27, when the
French Government, last of the five governments to do so,
deposited its ratification of the treaty with the Soviet
Foreign Ministry in Moscow. This date also marked the last
meeting of the Allied Council and the abolition of the
Allied Military Command in Austria. Final withdrawal of all
Allied forces was scheduled for October 25, which marked the
end of the ninety-day period specified in the State Treaty.
The last troops actually left the country on October 21, and
the withdrawal was completed.
Price of Liberty
The background of the Second Austrian Republic has
been traced, which established that Austria had been
plagued by numerous problems and instability, in the period
between 1918 and 1955. The enactment of the State Treaty
was the climax of the Austrian drive for independence and
the beginning of a new policy of neutrality.
The neutralization of Austria was the price paid for






of Austria's neutrality, it is appropriate to recall that
neutrality occurred as the result of fulfilling an inter-
national obligation arising out of the 1955 Moscow Memoran-
dum* Thus, a state which in its recent past had alternated
between a center of power and a power vacuum in Central
Europe has become a neutral buffer state between the NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries*
It should be noted that the State Treaty contained
nothing about Austria's permanent neutrality. On Kay 15,
1955, after the State Treaty was signed, the Austrian Govern-
ment submitted a Constitutional Bill to Parliament, in which
Austria pledged to remain a perpetual neutral* In the next











Neutrality exists in many forms* Each neutral state
must shape its own neutrality which actually is not a condi-
tion, but a continuous task* In the following sections, an
examination was made of the Austrian version of neutrality*
I* CONCEPT
Herman Frohman, writing in the spring of 1956, made
the following evaluation of neutrality:
In terms of practical politics neutrality may be con-
sidered as the foreign policy of any state which
involves itself in varying degrees of participation,
of political action or inaction, in world affairs.
The degree of neutrality which may be exercised by a
nation can be directly related to the amount of
sovereignty it enjoys* This sovereignty is deter-
mined by the freedom and independence with which the
nation makes its decisions, without being forced or
influenced by foreign pressure* Also, a nation 1
degree of weakness will determine its limitations and.
consequently, the character of its neutrality *****
Berlin Foreign Ministers Meeting
Austrian representatives as early as 1947 advocated a
neutral status for their country* At the Foreign Ministers
Meeting in Berlin in February, 1954, the Western Powers
Herman Frohman, "An Analysis Neutrality and
^5odern Neutralism," Journal of International Affair 1.




insisted that Austria should be free to choose military neu-
trality, but that it should not be forced into such a status
by the State Treaty. On February 16, Secretary Dulles,
representing the United States, echoed this policy:
A neutral status is an honorable status if it is
voluntarily chosen by a nation. rJnd&£ the Austrian
State Treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be
free to choose for herself to be a neutral nation.
Certainly, the United States would fully respect
Austria's choice in this respect .3
On the same day, Austrian Foreign Minister Figl stated;
I have stated unambiguously that Austria will do
everything to keep herself free from foreign mili-
tary influence.4
Relation to World Problems
immm i« , n ail— i ii 1 1 »m»mi MM»rtMi—
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It was with this background that the Austrian State
Treaty and Neutrality Act came into force. The Soviets did
not attempt to disguise the fact that they regarded the
State Treaty as a means to lure the Federal Republic of
Germany into neutralism and away from the newly-formed mili-
tary alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the Western European union* Despite this, an Austrian
interpretation of the applicability of the so-called
See Foreign Ministers Meeting ; Berlin Discussions ,
January 25 to ./ubruary 13 1 1954 , United States 15eparEnenF"of
State PuSIication No. 5*3^9 (Washington: Government Printing
w'£ xj.Ce, J.733 )
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"Austrian solution" to other countries was ably expressed by
Foreign Minister Kreislcy in a Zurich speech on May 4, 1960:
• • • nowhere, since 1955, can one find a clear state-
ment by i responsible Soviet statesman indicating that
the neutrality of Germany would lead to reunification.
I still remember a comment by one of the most important
personalities in the Kremlin who . . • told me that
relations with a country of seven million can be regu-
lated by a . • • treaty document, but in the case of a
country of seventy million relations are not so easily
arranged. The example of Austria has misled many
political observers to believe that neutrality, as such,
could possibly be brought in everywhere in all situa-
tions, to solve outstanding world problems. We believe
that • • • it is like disarmament, only possible when
it does not result in a change in the international
political balance. A policy of neutrality is a state's
expression of will* Today it can hardly be imposed on
a large country from without ... this, of course,
could be done at a time of national weakness, but no
one could, without belligerent intervention prevent




Switzerland, which was specifically cited as the
example of neutrality for Austria in the 1955 Moscow Memo-
randum, had had generations of experience in developing a
concept and practices of neutrality. It was immediately
apparent to Austrian leaders that the country *s neutrality
would differ appreciably from the Swiss model. There we.
essential differences, particularly in national backgrou-
5William L. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the execu-
tion of Austria, An Analysis of" "soviet policy in Austria,
""TsjgT TSonnT" 3Tegler anc' my, 19^9), p/TSc7""
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and location. Sven more significant was Austria »s intention
to join the United Nations—a step that the Swiss Government
considered inconsistent with neutrality. Consequently, no




On October 26, 1955, the day after the termination of
the Allied occupation, a Constitutional Law on Austria*
s
permanent neutrality was enacted. This brief statute reads
in its principal Article I:
(1) In order to preserve its permanent independence
in relation to the outside world and the inviolability
of its territory, Austria proclaims by its free will
its perpetual neutrality. Austria will maintain and
defend this neutrality by every means at its disposal.
(2) Toward this aim, Austria will never participate
in military alliances and will not permit the estab-
lishment of military bases of its territory.
6
When this statute came into force on November 5, a status
hitherto unknown in Austria's history was established.
The avowed purpose of the statute was to announce
Austria* s perpetual or permanent neutrality, which consti-
tuted a declaration of policy. If this liad amounted to
Pi
United States Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 33,





being all that was involved, then this would not have had
the effect of making Austria a permanently neutral state in
international law. However, as mentioned in the last chap-
ter, Austria did not make this unilateral declaration of its
own free will* Despite the expressed purposes of preserving
its independence and territorial integrity, the unwritten
reason was to fulfill a condition demanded by the Soviet
Union. Josef L. Kunz, in "Austria's Permanent Neutrality,"
recognized this obligation and concluded that because of it,
7Austria's declaration had an international legal effect,
Recognition
Austria's neutrality was recognised by the former
s
^upying Powers in identical notes dated December 6, 1958
•
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany made a
similar declaration on December 8. With this recognition by
the permanent members of the Security Council and many other
states, Austria's permanent neutrality came into existenc
in international lawj since recognition bound the recognis-
ing states to respect permanent neutrality*
7Josef L. Kunz, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality." The
American Journal of International Law, 50 (April, 1956), p.
421*
%*or the text of United States note, see Paul E*
Zinner (ed*), Documents on American Relations 195 5 (New Yorks
Harper and Brother, 1956T7 p. 163*
9Kunz, op. cit





Shortly before the State Treaty was signed, Chancel-
lor Raab in describing the nature of Austria's neutrality
declared:
The Christian-Western basic principles and the intel-
lectual adherence to the Western World are a foregone
conclusion which forms the basis of a constructive
policy of neutrality.^
After a debate between spokesmen of the People *s anc". Social-
ist parties as to the official interpretation of the new
policy, Chancellor Raab on October 26, 1955, described the
Austrian brand of neutrality to Parliament:
Neutrality obligates the state, but not the individual
eitisen. The Intellectual an-- .itical :. i of
the individual, especially the freedom of thB press
and expression of opinion is not affected. Also,
there is, therewith, no basis for a pledge to ideologi-
cal neutrality. I want to further sires;i ... that
the military neutrality * • « will contain no commit-
ments and obligations in economic and cultural areas.il
Military Neutrality
The aforementioned Constitutional Law of October 1955
only cited three duties, two of which were negative. In
deference to the wishes of the Soviet Union, the negative
duties were not to accede to military alliances nor to
Stearman, ©£» cit . , p. 171.





permit the establishment of foreign military bases on
Austrian territory. The lone positive duty, inspired by the
Western Powers, was to defend its neutrality with all means
at its disposal. The prominence given by the Austrian
statute to these three duties emphasized the military char-
acter of Austria's permanent neutrality and its freedom of
12internal and foreign policy in all other respects.
The Austrian Government has taken certain steps to
reinforce the official view of being only a military neutral,
In December 1955, after joining the United Nations, Chancel-
lor Raah stated that:
For a country which has declared itself militarily
utral it is of special importance that it should
belong to the United Nations, as this membership
will give it security and support in its foreign
policy. **
Another step was the expulsion of the Communist-front "World
Federation of Trade Unions " headquarters from Austria in
14
early 1956 for violating Austrian law. In thei. Lsion
to join the Council of Europe in April 1956, the Austrians
acknowledged that they were part of the Western World.
Thus, Austrian neutrality comes between that of n,







News item in The New York Times. , December 16, 1955.






Switzerland, which has remained outside. Finally, in his
1964 Policy Declaration, Chancellor Klaus stated that he
realized how important neutrality had been for the country.
He reiterated that the strictest loyalty to international
15
agreements must remain the basis of trustful relations.
IV. NEUTRALITY AND THE CHARTER OF
OS UNITED NATIONS
Rights and Duties of Neutrals
Before considering the obligations of membership in
the United Nations, it was useful to recall the inter-
national rights and duties of a permanent neutral as estab-
lished by the legal development and permanent practices of
Switzerland. Alfred Verdross, an authority on international
law, wrote in ''Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United
Nations Organization" that
5
1. The permanently neutral state is bound to obey
the international rules of neutrality during a war-
between other countries. 2. It is not only entitle^
but also obliged, to defend its territory by all means
against any foreign attack. Permanent neutrality
therefore must be an armed neutrality. 3. It may
not enter into any obligations in peacetime which may
involve it in war. It is not allowed to make treaties
of alliance, assistance, protection, or guaranty with
other nations. It must not allow other states to
erect military bases in its territory, as it may
thereby be involved in war. 4. It may, however,
apply to other Powers for a guaranty of the integrity








of its own territory, 5. It is absolutely free in
its domestic and foreign policy as far as it has no
other agreements. 6. In particular, it is not bound
to observe an ideological neutrality* When ideologi-
cal neutrality was demanded by a few Nazi authors this
demand was rejected by Switzerland. The freedom of
the neutral press was expressed in the Hague Convention
on Neutral Rights and Duties (1907). 16
Compatibility with Charter
The admission of Austria to membership in the United
Nations indicated that its perpetual neutralized status was
considered compatible with participation in the world organi-
zation, since Austria was not granted a special legal status.
Such acceptance depended on the reasoning that this member
of the United Nations, in view of its neutrality, would not
be called upon by the Security Council to participate in
economic or military sanctions. Such measures are a clear
violation of neutrality, as outlined above.
There were provisions in the Covenant of the League
of Nations which provided that all members were obligated to
take immediate economic steps against an aggressor and to
permit the transit of troops through their territories. In
contrast, the rules of the United Nations Charter are more
flexible. It is stipulated in Article 39 that the Security
Council is only entitled to determine the existence of
16Alfred Verdross, "Austria »s Permanent Neutrality
and the United Nations Organization," The American Journal
of International Law, 50 (January 1956),' pp. 53-64.
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threats to the peace, and to decide what measures shall be
taken to maintain or restore international peace. Alfred
Verdross points out:
Therefore, united Nations members are not bound to
take immediate action against an aggressor, as was
the duty of the League *s members, 17
The Security Council is authorized to deal with the
problem of aggression and may, thus, excuse individual mem-
bers from taking active measures to restore the peace
•
Furthermore, participation in certain measures, such as tne
granting of transit rights in accordance with Article 43 of
the Charter, depends on special agreements between the
Security Council and the individual member state. Since the
permanent members of the Security Council have recognized
Austria's neutrality, they are obliged not to call upon
Austria to participate in any action which might compromise
her neutrality, Cven if the Security Council was unable to
act due to the exercise of a veto, Alfred Verdross still
considered it possible for Austria to maintain an impartial
position in dealing with an act of aggression against
another state because:
In this situation, as well as during the time before
action of the Security Council, the sta' ave the
right of individual or collective self-defense und
Article 51 of the Charter* But they are not obliged







even in the case of a recommendation by the General
Assembly , because such recommendations are not
legally binding. In both cases the states can choc
in accordance with Article 51 whether to help t
victim of aggression by military or economic sanc-
tions or to maintain neutrality. 18
V. KILirAR; JNSE
National Opposition
Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky recently i
I
marked that "neutrality means qualified independence on one
19
side and the determination to defend it, on the other."
When Austria accepted the status of neutrality, it uncon-
ditionally agreed to defend its independence and territory
by all means at its disposal against foreign attack. Since
permanent neutrality was .ted with fti -jitrality by
the former Occupying Powers, it b« necessary for Austria
to rebuild a national military establishment capable of ful-
filling the mission described abo\
Although the right to rearm was restored to Austria
by the State Treaty, the Governments efforts along these
lines were hindered by widespread public opposition founded
on an abhorrence of the use of force. Along with this
repugnance to rearmament, which steamed from before the
1
1
Verdross, op . cit.
, p. 67.





German collapse, was a popular slogan to the effect that
"Little Austria is not capable by herself of offering an
20
effective defense against attacks upon her borders."
Further, many Austrians were unwilling to be burdened with
the high costs of maintaining a defense force. Finally, the
Austrian Communist Party opposed thw creation of a popular
army and conducted a vigorous propaganda program. This
action was taken independently of Soviet instructions, since
earlier the Soviet Government had agreed to the armed neu-
trality of Austria in the 1955 Moscow Memorandum.
Creation of Army
The Government of the United States agreed on Septem-
ber 27, 1955, to let Austria have $22 million worth of
military property for a token payment and a pledge to settle
outstanding claims. The total amount of material left
behind by United States Forces in Austria was valued at $40
million. Austria also inherited surplus equipment from the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. A general conscription
law was enacted by Parliament, and the Army and Air Force
were virtually created from scratch, patterned after a blend
of the Swiss and Swedish military establishments . All
ethnic groups of the national community were represented in
the military.
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According to the National Defense Act, the purpose of
the Army is to protect the State* s frontiers and constitu-
tional institutions, as well as to maintain domestic order
if called upon. The Army is also obliged to assist in times
of natural disasters. While in office, the late Chancellor
Raab stated:
Austria does not want to participate in any kind of
competitive armament. She has no intention of
threatening anyone and will always be committed to
defensive roles .21
This summarized a typical Austrian attitude and alludes to
the type of operational planning for which Austrian military
staffs must prepare.
In August 1956, the Federal Ministry of National
Defense was created* Operational control was shifted from
the National Defense Office in the Federal Chancellery to
the new ministry. The formal role of Commander-in-Chief
remained in the person of the President. Technical and
administrative military matters are reviewed by the National
Defense Council, whose membership includes the Chancellor,
Vice Chancellor, Minister of Defense, and two representa-
tives from the Steering Committee of Parliament.
A number of unprovoked incidents involving Communist
aircraft occurred in 1956 along the frontiers with Hungary









and Czechoslovakia. These aix violations convinced many
Austrians who aad opposed rearmament that it was not only-
prudent to be an armed neutral, but necessary to achieve a
high state of military preparedness as rapidly as possible.
From a token police force in 1955, the Austrians have h&en
able to organize and equip a modern defense force of some
sixty thousand men. Although the military is neither large
nor combat tested, the nation shares the confidence that
this strength adds immeasurable force to the legal obliga-
tions placed upon other states by formal recognition of
Austria's permanent neutrality.
There is a continuing requirement to maintain and
modernise military hardware. On March 27, 1963, the Defense
Ministry disclosed that the United States had agreed to
grant to Austria $40 million for that purpose. Chancellor
Klaus stated in April 1964 that th& government considered
national defense "a 3pecial state-political necessity war-
ranting also financial and economic sacrifices."* In an
effort to improve the air defenses of the country, Defense
Minister Georg Prader stated in -July 1364 that Austria
wanted to amend the State Treaty so that it could acquire
op
News item in the Arbeiter-Zeltunq , April 3, 1964,








misailss for its araad forcaa.23 No official talk, have
been held on this request to date*
In summary, Austria's permanent neutrality resulr
as the fulfillment of an international obligation and condi-
tion demanded by the Soviet union* Austrian neutrality was
similar to the Swiss model in that it became an armed neu-
trality and only of a military nature. No commitments to
economic, cultural, or ideological neutrality were made by
the Austrian Government*
The best yuarantee of permanent neutrality is a
strong army and the determination to defend this neutrality
against any foreign threat* As a permanent neutral, Austria
has accepted the duty to defend her independence and has the
right of self-defense under Article SI of the Charter of the
United Nations* The Austrian Government intends to maintain
a modern d W force and has shown the determination to
remain free*
Following this, a chapter is devoted to the substance
of Austria's foreign policy, with emphasis on those external
forces which have shaped the contents of the: existing na-
tional policies* It will be shown that the definition of
the national interest has remained fairly stable in the
postwar period md 9 in particular, since ]









THE SUBSTANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY
Policy Goals
Austrian foreign policy has had four major objectives
in the postwar period: to ensure the necessities of life
for the people; to create a unified state 5 to restore rela-
tions with other countries, especially with neighboring
states} and finally, as gradual progress was made toward the
achievement of these goals, to conclude a State Treaty and
secure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austrian
territory. This latter goal was frustrated for a decade due
to the advent of the Cold War. The military occupation was
in itself humiliating. It was, however, mitigated by the
gradual relaxation of Allied controls which were severe at
the outset.
Prior to the effective date of the State Treaty, the
control of Austrian foreign policy had heesi jointly deter-
mined by Austrian officials and the Allied Council for
Austria. This body was composed of four Allied High Cor.
sloners, one appointed by each of the Occupying Powers.
deal with this foreign authority , Austrians joined together
for the first time to achieve common goals. Political dif-
ferences were either compromised or excluded, and the








Committee was likewise constituted. Richard Hiscocks, in
The Rebirth of Austria , wrote
s
Whereas, at first, the Coalition [government] re-
mained for external reasons, it now remains for
internal [reasons 1.1
I. SEARCH FOR SECURITY
National interests
With the restoration of sovereignty in 195S, Austria
regained a modest voice in international affairs* Since
then, the government has been determined to remain fr... - om
foreign domination and to participate in all discus.
which might lead to greater cooperation in the world, m
particularly in Europe. Austrian foreign policy ,*n
generally successful because it has been restrained, consist-
ent, and satisfactory to both major power bloc.
In the formulation of foreign policy in the aftermath
of the Allied occupation p.. , Austrian decision-ma.
have considered three basic purposes to be in the national
interest « First, and of foremost Importance was the abso-
lute necessity to maintain permanent neutrality* m rami-
fications of any change in this policy ware well understood
by government officials, Soviet leaders have made numerous
Richard Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (London
s





public statements to the effect that action would be under-
taken by the Soviet Government if Austrian neutrality was
ever violated. Another purpose was to mold public consensus
and promote further industrial development, which has been
fostered by extensive political collaboration within the
coalition pattern of government. Finally, the government
deemed it essential to maintain trustful and friendly rela-
tions with all neighboring states*
The people of Austria support the resultant firm but
cautious foreign policy, Austria is a small state with
limited mou . The reconstruction of the country has
just been recently completed, along with the final material
obligations to the Soviet Union, stemming from the provisions
of the State Treaty, D*»pit« these limited means, Foreign
Minister Kreisky has said:
Nevertv >, Austria is sparing no effort to do her
part in the advancement of th
principal goods and commodities exported by the
developing countries are general!
duties in Austria or subject to low tariffs only.
This practice will continue an
new agreements on tropical goods will stabilise
prices and raise at the sane time in-
come of the contracting countries , then Austria is
ready to conclude such agreements ,^
The Austrian contribution to the econo; s* of the
developing nations is analyzed in Cha /III,
i
Austrian Information (Hay 15, 1964),
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The people are security conscious, and the average
man in the street knows that the independence of Austria
resulted from a sudden Soviet policy shift. Policy-makers
can depend upon popular approval of all attempts to maintain
a climate of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
Chancellor Klaus, in his initial policy declaration to Par-
liament on April 2, 1964, made this observations
Our relations with the big powers are harmonious and
marked by the absence of any major open question. 3
Concerning relations with Eastern European states,
Chancellor Klaus in the same declaration noted the improve-
ment of diplomatic relations with Rumania and Bulgaria in
the wake of recent claims settlement agreements concluded
with those countries. He then emphasised that the govern-
ment sought similar improved relations with Czechoslovakia
and Hungary, stressing, however, that such agreements de-
pended upon an early satisfactory settlement of pending
Austrian property claims against those countries. In June
1964, the Hungarian Government responded to this feeler by
4
making substantial counter property claims.
The Austrian Government constantly guards against
sizable foreign investments which might compromise the
country's neutrality. Most Auatrians fear the re-entry of
3News item in Arbeiter-Zuntunq , April 3, 1964.
4News item in tl ..tung , June 9, 1964.




foreign economic domination such as that experienced during
the seven years of IJaai rule. Attention has been focused on
German investments in particular, because of the volume of
trade between the two countries and acknowledged German
interest in expanding commercial influence in Austria. For
these reasons, the government closely regulates German sub-
sidiary companies and prevents German corporations fr^
gaining controlling interests in Austrian enterprises.
Another fundamental objective of Austrian foreign
policy traceable to this concern for security was the promo-
tion of friendly relations with all nation-states, without
consideration of internal political structures or ideologies.
This task was widely supported and has become a policy maxim.
^graphical Location«————»——.————i
i
nn ii m iiM iim in in in 'I i i h i
These goals seem extraordinary reasonable in view of
the geographical location of the country and the nature of
its territory. The country was strategically important for
centuries, since it commanded the passes east of Switserla:
from Central Surope to Italy and the Adriatic and was able
to complement either German or Italian foreign policies.
Further, many European paths of trade and migration passed
through Austria. The impact of these factors on Austrian
history was summarized by Henry Haalitt, in "One World or
Many."
' - - «
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Politically, her very vulnerability to Surope has
always driven her to seek safety in broad European
combinations , such as the Holy Roman Empire and
the Holy Alliance. By their nature and interests,
Austrians are internationalists san reserve*
5
Austria retained strategic importance in the after-
math of the Second World War as it became a buffer state
between the Western and Communist blocs* The country has
over twelve hundred miles of contingent frontiers with Com-
munist states, including Tito»s Yugoslavia. Approximately
two-thirds of the population reside close to these borders
and actively support a "good neighbor" policy.
Although the Second Austrian Republic is a landlocked
state, the nation will shortly make greater use of the
Danube River, when the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal is opened.
This will link the North Sea with the Black Sea. It in-
volves improving the navigability of the Main and the con-
struction of a canal from Bamberg on the Main to Regensburg
on the Danube. The Danube is, in reality, a corridor link-
ing Central with Southeastern Europe, and Surope with the
Soviet Union and the Middle East.
Austria is topographically an Alpine country with a
great variety of terrain. Largely mountainous, the ranges
Henry Hazlitt, "One World or Many''," Newsweek
(October 7, 1963), 95.
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cross the country from west to east, merging in the north
and northeast into the Danube Valley and Vienna Basin.
There are lowland fringes to the north, northeast, and south.
In the south, the land is bisected by the Alps, in which
many of the big rivers (such as the lxai 9 Enns, Drau, and the
Mur) begin.
Barely half of the area is suitable for agriculture,
and one-third of the country is covered with forests. While
Austria has been able to produce enough foodstuffs to meat
domestic requirements, there has been a consistent postwar
policy of agricultural expansion and modernization of farm
equipment. Current production is higher in every department
than before 1933, when agriculture was neglected by the
Nazis who concentrated on industrial development* By 1946,
agricultural production amounted to less than half of the
1938 level. In summary, such factors as agricultural pro-
duction, limited natural resources, and the landlocked
geographical location of the state must be collectively




The traditional role of the country was formulated by














It is the will of her people that Austria should
issue not challenges, but invitations, should be
a meeting place not a dividing line, nobody's
bastion but everybody* s bridge* 7
This role has become increasingly important at the "grass
roots" level. The proximity of Austria to Communist states
has made Vienna a well-placed and convenient meeting place
for Western and Eastern Europeans* Upwards of eight thou-
sand Austrians crossed weekly into Czechoslovakia to visit
friends and relatives in 1964, Some three thousand Czechs
were permitted to enter Austria weekly as tourists in the
same year, as a sign of friendly relations between the two
countries
•
An agreement was reached in the summer of 1963 which
expanded limited border crossings between Austria and Yugo-
slavia. This was made possible by enlarging the border
zones whose inhabitants were entitled to get permits and by
B
extending the validity of permits to seventy-two hours.
Die Presse recently ran a detailed article on the eastern
border situation, predicting a continuation of the "tourist
9liberalization wave." The significance of these exchanges
was that Communist tourists could travel to Austria, while
7Hiscocks, c£. cit
• , p. 238.
News item in the Neue Tagezeltung . August 8, 1963.








exit visas were difficult to obtain for travel to other
Western European states*
The majority of the people believed that their future
importance as a nation was based on their cultural contri-
butions, both past and present. Richard Hiscocks points out
that:
Diplomatic entanglements and power politics are
inappropriate for a country of seven million in-
habitants in a highly vulnerable position. The
political aim of Austrian statesmen is to justify
Austria's independent existence by maintaining a
healthy economy and social order and by setting
an example of good world citizenship. io
Finally, there was a widespread conviction in the country
that Austria will once again play the role of mediator in
international disputes. This view was expressed by most
leading statesmen.
III. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
Since 1937, Austria has developed first under German
and later Allied supervision a number of basic industries.
These have included iron and steel, oil, and chemicals,
which have all been nationalized since the country* s libera-
tion in 1945 under pressure from the Socialist Party. Vice
Chancellor Pittermann stated that:











The nationalized industry today contributes 26 per
cent of Austria's total exports, largely owing to
long marketing efforts in eastern and southeastern
rope • 12
Special Position
Austrian commerce must transit through the territory
of other states, since Austria has no direct access to t-
sea. The effects of external trade policies and transport
rates of neighboring Western states and the menace of Com-
munist frontiers to the East, combine to heavily influence
the nation's internal prosperity, political stability, and
even national survival* The economic situation becomes more
gloomy when it is recalled that Allied postwar controls had
a retarding effect upon her economy and reconstruction. An
added burden was the material reparations demanded by tl,
Soviet Government. These factors have heon recognized by
the European Free Trade Association as constituting a
special Austrian position.
European Economic Community
The six members of the European Economic Community
collectively represent Austria 1 s largest market area. In
1962, Austria bought nearly $1 billion worth of commodities
from the Common Market and sent 50 per cent of her exports,
12News item in the Arbelter-lDeitung , June 9, 1964.
ill!
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valued at approximately $631,000,000, into the Community.
The remainder of Austrian trade fell into three categories
of nearly equal magnitude: with the European Free Trade
Association, the Communist states, and the rest of the world,
In spite of the pattern established by the delivery of repa-
rations to the Soviet Union, the latter country did not loom
large in Austria's trade picture, taking only 4 per cent of
her exports and providing 3 per cent of her imports in
1962. 13
The accelerated reduction of internal trade barriers
within the Suropean Sconomic Community constituted a serious
threat to the position of Austrian exports into that region.
Exports of goods and services in 1962 amounted to 24.6 per
i .
cent of Austria 1 s Gross National Product. This meant that
discrimination of any sort directly threatened current pros-
perity and further economic development. There was no
evidence at this time of any down-turn in volume of Austrian
exports to the European Economic Community.
Coming to terms with the European Economic Community
and having all tariffs reduced were the foremost foreign
policy issues in 1964. The Austrian Government has
13Austrian Economy in Figures , Year 1962 (Vienna:
Economic Department of CreaTtanstalt-Bankverain , 1963),
pp. 18-19.





frequently announced the principles that it considered
acceptable and the conditions which must be met before join-
ing the European Economic Community* Federal Trade Minister
Bock, charged with all ESC negotiations, has stated that
Austria is:
1* Willing to accept the foreign trade tariff of
the European economic Community. 2. Will elimina;
all customs duties between her and the ESC. The
phasing of tariff reductions in this t . t will
have to be negotiated. 3. Will abolish quantita-
tive restrictions on trade. 4. For the reduction
of tariff and quantitative restrictions, a minimum
number of exceptions will be appro 5. Will
accept the principles of the farm policy, but wants
to align her own policy to that of the European
Economic Community. *5
The formal decision to proceed toward broader eco-
nomic integration in Western Europe was reached by the
Austrian Cabinet on December 12, 1961. In a communique, the
government concluded that:
Austria would act simultaneously with Switzerland
and Sweden, the other neutrals associated with
EFTA. It further declared that full adherence to
the Treaty of Rome would impair their status of
neutrality, and this necessitated the application
for associate membership. 3.6
The three neutrals agreed on joint as well as parallel dis-
cussions with the European Economic Community, with emphasis
on the economic clauses of the Treaty of Rome. At this time,
Austrian President Schaerf said;
. .^porter (November 12, 1963), 1.





The Austrian neutrality policy, based on the nation's
constitutional law, contains no provision which would
permit other countries to influence the internal,
external, or economic policies of the country. The
neutrals must insist on a clear delineation between
political policies on the one hand, and trade policies
on the other hand, so as not to endanger their
status .l 7
The Austrian Government has made it evident that it
is willing to cooperate in the economic integration of
Europe, to the extent her political status will permit. The
political implications inherent in the Treaty of Rome are of
doncem to the Government. Austria might find herself in
political controversies if the European Economic Community
should ever decide to pursue policies toward third states
which might endanger international peace. Any arrangement
with the European Economic Community must include an escape
clause to prevent such an entanglement. This is a condition
sine qua non .
Another important prerequisite is the authority to
maintain separate and predominantly bilateral trading rela-
18tions with the Communist states. Most exports to these
latter countries are manufactured in the former Soviet Zone
and are intended specifically for these markets. On the
other hand, the majority of these finished products are
1 7Ibid .
* "Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria, Still in the







neither competitive nor marketable in Western Europe. There
are also political considerations involved, since closing or
converting these enterprises will likely result in labor
displacement and unemployment, thereby adding to the strain
upon the state. This is not an uncomplicated matter in-
volving only Austria, but rather is of direct consequence to
all members of the European Economic Community who have com-
plied with all of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome*
The Government requested negotiations with the
European Economic Community with the object of becoming an
Associate Member under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome on
December 15, 1961* This petition was submitted with similar
documents from the governments of Sweden and Switserlan
When the Soviet Government was informed of the Austrian in-
tention of establishing closer ties with the European
Economic Community, a note was sent to the Austrian author
ties which expressed grave concern over "association with
any political or economic organisation of which the Federal
19Republic of Germany was a leading member."
Austrian response to this allegation was firm;
Austria is interested in having the best possible
economic relations with all countries mm
of political structure. The Government felt im-
pelled to take this action after the Unit
News item in the Hew York Times, December 15, 1961.
It





Kingdom had applied for full membership. Moreover,
the Government had b^en instructed to take the
initiative for association by unanimous vote of the
Parliament on June 21, 1961.20
In conjunction with this reply, the Austrian Government
reassured the Soviet Government that this 3tap was not a
violation of Austria's neutrality* Although Soviet opposi-
tion diminished, Premier Khrushchev, at a Kremlin reception
on July 4, 1962, reiterated Moscow's opposition to the
European Economic Community, as the "economic force of the
21
aggressive North Atlantic bloc. n At the same time,
Khrushchev expressed his confidence that the envisac
Austrian arrangement with the Common Market countries woi
be in keeping with Austria's neutrality.
On May 15, 1962, the EEC Council of Ministers invited
the Austrian Government to present further information.
Next, the formal Austrian application was submitted to the
Council on June 20&. Foreign Minister Kreisky presented the
amplifying information to the Council on July 28, with the
following conclusions
There exists ... no differences between the Com-
munity of the Six and Austria, as to th<
of an integrated and harmonized economic policy in
oe .... There is an hon&.-
to come to constructive solutions and since the
necessary flexibility will c nly not
Austrian Information ( » 1
•
Tlews item in The New York Time.





it will be possible to devise ways and means to bring
about a positive cooperation of the neutrals in the
economic integration of Europe without endangering
their political status, Austria is convinced that
only by a just economic settlement with the EEC,
serious political, social, and economic consequent
can be avc .>22
After hearing this oral presentation, the Council of
Ministers instructed the ESC Coiaraission to prepare a report
analyzing the possibilities of Austrian participation in the
Common Market* Fruitful exploratory talks were conducted
in December 1963. In its session of January 13, 1964 , the
Austrian Cabinet was briefed on these discussions by the
Ministers of Trade and Foreign Affairs. These reports out-
lined the general nature of the proposed Association Council,
Committee, and Mixed Commission. The EEC Commission has
taken cognisance of these proposals without commenting on
24
them,
European i' .. . - ^.o. Association
In contrast with her close ties with members of I
European Economic Community, trade- relations with the
European Free Trade Association countries are newer and
or entire text , see Austria and tl
(Washington: :>n Office, July 30, 1962).
23
'*: a, Switzerland , and Austria, Etill in the
Waiting Room," ©£• cit • , 132*
24
Austrian Information (Janu. ."-1, 1964), 2*













limited. First, Austrian trade is not directed toward the
sterling bloc. Unlike Scandinavian Mi '• of the European
Free Trade Association, Austria has no particular economic
or historic links with the united Kingdom. Unlike the
Swiss, the Austrians, except for the issue of neutrality,
would have jumped at the opportunity from the beginning to
join the European Economic Community. Second, while the
trade pattern with the European Free Trade members has
developed favorably, the volume was considerably smaller.
For example, in 1962, Austria exported $191,300,000 or 15.3
per cent and imported 13.2 p^r cent amounting to 5202,600,000
from the European Free Tra iation states. In the
first six months of 1963, imports were IB. 3 per cent higher
from these countries than during the correspond!^ In
1962, while overall imports cent. During
this same period, Austrian exports to this g of states
were 16 per cent of the fcal.
"
The members of the European :- . . '. . . Association
have officially the Au m view regarding harmony
between themselves and the members of the European Economic
Community. This position was that ETTA should be employed
'""Austrian Information (Karch 30, 1963), 1.
"
°SFTA Reporter (October 15, 1963), 3.
m©•**
-•„-
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as an instrument of negotiation to harmonize mutual trade
interests, and not regarded as an end in itself. Therefore,
as far as Austria was concerned, membership in the ciurop^an
Free Trade Association was no substitute for economic part-
nership with the European Economic Community.
The Austrian application for associate status in the
European Economic Community is consistent with EFTA policies,
Members may conduct separate negotiations on trade policy
with either the EEC or any of its six members. Currently,
the EFTA members have approved of Austria* s dec bo pro-
ceed with explorato. Iks, while the rest have postpon
further discussions. This was agreed upon at the 1963
Ministerial Meeting held in Lisbon. The logic behind this
decision was recognition of Austria* s special position*
Summarv
the outcome of future negotiations with the
European Economic Community, Austria* s foreign policies he
been successful in the postwar period. The Austrian Govern-
ment feels c to reach an understanding with t-
European Economic Community because the country *s trade
more oriented toward the Common Market area than any other
member c an Free Trade Association. In t
search for national security, the Austrian nation has






non-governmental forces and agencies which affect the foreign






In undertaking to determine what factors comprise the
Austrian ideology, it was enlightening first to examine the
historical experienc
sacicqround
The serious structural and economic deficiencies of
the First Austrian Republic were alluded to in Chapter II.
In 1918, only a small core of people and territory remained
to form the new Austrian state, its inception as
sovereign state, the nation was divided about its role in
the international state system. Some desired a federation
with other Oanubian countries to replace the lost empire.
Many sought union with Germany. Another segment of the
population believed in freedom and welcomed the opportunity
for self-government.
The resultant dissension was reflected in the origi-
nal name of the first Republic, which was German-Austria. A
provisional National Assembly met in Vienna during Nov.





Austria was "an essential part of the German Republic."
This decision was confirmed by a Constituent National Assem-
bly, but later was rescinded; September 10, 1919, in accord-
ance with the terms of the Peace Treaty at Saint Germain,
the word "German" was dropped from the designation of the
Republic,
One fundamental prerequisite for democracy is a sense
of common purpose and a sharing of mutual values. Unfor-
tunately, neither the citizens nor political parties during
the short life of the First Republic achieved a meaningful
compromise or rallied to a single cause. About 40 per cent,
mostly peasants and lower middle-class residents of Vienna,
were Conservative Catholics; another 40 per cent, mostly
workers in Vienna and other industrial centers were Social
Democrats; the remaining percentage, mostly the urban upper
2
middle class, were Pan Germans.
The dominant political parties advocated extremely
diverse platforms. There were Fascist elements on the ex-
treme Right and Communists on the Left. After the civil war
in 1934, authoritarian rule was enforced until the German
1
-ichard Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (London:
Oxford University Press, 195 3)
,
p. 2.
2Hans Kohn, The Future of Austria, (New York: For-








seizure four years later. The Social Democratic Party was
outlawed during this period of confusion, which contributed
to the lack of national unity. Austria was renamed t:
Ostmark in 1938, and its interests were systematically sub-
2
ordinated to those of the Reich. The initial Austrian
encounter with parliamentary democracy was a bitter failure,
but the people learned important lessons that provided the
Second Austrian Republic with the cooperation and harmony of
interests needed to insure its survival.
National Purpose
Austrian politicians finally realized the merit of a
united nation under the stress of Nazi occupation. This
shift in attitudes was materially strengthened by common
suffering under the reign of the German Gestapo. The con-
cept of fraternity became an essential element in the growth
of a national identity and ideology. As a result, domestic
politics have been characterized by extensive cooperation
between the two dominant political parties, and foreign
policy has been essentially bipartisan. In a New Year's
message soon after becoming President, Dr. Renner said:
Froir experience with Italians and Germans the
Austrian people in 1945 finally drew the only
possible conclusion; self-reliance and
3Hiscocks, op . cit
• , p. 8.









independence; no Anschluss at all, neither with the
East nor the South, neither with the West nor tl
North; one thing only is desirable, entrance into
the community of the United Nations, 4
The historical background of the Second Austrian
Republic and substance of Austria's foreign policy have been
presented in earlier discussions to support the conclusion
that Austria belongs with the Western world, while keeping
open economic ties with the Communist states. Next, it is
appropriate to examine the structure of Austrian society and
look more closely at the people who have built a modern
state from the ruins of the Second World War.
II. NATIONAL COMMUNITY
Structurehi i
Twice in recent history, the composition of the
national community has radically changed. The former great
aristocratic families of the Hapsburg era lost most of their
fortunes and influence by the outbreak of the Second World
War. The Jewish Community was practically eliminated during
5the period of German occupation. After the war, several
million refugees passed through Austria, residing within its
Ibid., p. 246.
5
For further comments, see John Gunther, Inside
Surope Today (New York: Harpers and Row, 1962 5, pp. 179-181,
-
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frontiers from varying periods of a few days to years. Con-
sidering this great flux in the structure of the national
community, it was remarkable that a high degree of uni-
formity existed in the present society.
The population is nearly homogeneous along racial,
linguistic, and religious lines. Over 98 per cent of the
nation are German speaking, while the remainder consists of
small Croat and Czech -speaking minorities in Burgenland, and
Slovene-speaking minorities in Carinthia. Approximately 89
per cent profess to be Roman Catholics, 6 per cent Protes-
tants, with the remainder split among other faiths. To
foster national unity, the Austrian Government has enforced,
since 1945, the rigid separation of Church and State.
Minority rights are protected by the Constitution, and equal
treatment is given to all sectors of the community.
The last national census conducted in March 1961
showed a population slightly in excess of seven million,
which represented only a 1.9 per cent population gain over
the previous decade. Young people are scarce, there is a
low birthrate, and one-third of the population are over
fifty years old. Largely as a result of the Second World
War, one out of every eight women are widows.
William H. Hale, "Political Reunion in the Vienna






Austria is a land of skilled artisans. Many are
7
employed in industries nationalized in the postwar period.
In an article in the Austrian Infox'mation , it was pointed
out that:
Austria 9 s per capita Gross National Product occupied,
together with Italy* s, the lowest position among
Western European industrialized countries. Statis-
tical data reveal the following picture for 1961:
ince - $1,272; United Kingdom - $1,241; Austria -
$849; and Italy - $650.8
The situation has not altered appreciably in recent years.
education
Austria has one of the lowest rates of illiteracy in
the world, less than 1 per cent. The country owes this to
the fact that it has one of the oldest compulsory school
systems in Europe. The General Education Act of 1774 decreed
that all children had to attend school for at least six years,
In 1859, compulsory schooling was extended to eight years.
Charles A. Gulick, in Austria , From Hapsburg to Hitler ,
pointed out that by 1908 Austria had developed a typical
European school system:
7The economic structure has evolved in postwar years
into a mixture of a modified form of state capitalism and
private enterprise. The state owns or controls the heavy
industries and credit system. The light industries and the
retail trades are run as private enterprises that depend for
credit on a state-controlled banking system. For further
details, see "Euromarket," The New York Times (March 18,
1962).
Austrian Information (August 20, 1962), 2.




This system provided only eight years of free com-
pulsory common schools for poorer, chiefly working-
class, children; but for the progeny of the better
classes it provided seven or eight years of second-
ary or middle schools, in addition to four or five
years of primary training.
^
The entire school system underwent reform during the period
-j
-
of the First Austrian Republic. The following statement
was made in The Suropa Year Book 1964 :
Today education is compulsory for all between the
ages of six and fourteen with extensive facilities
for further education . There are universities in
Vienna, Graz, and Innsbruck and important techno-
logical institutions in Vienna and Graz.il
Trends
An important trend in the national community h
the population shift from rural to urbai This has
occurred without a significant expansion of agricultural
output or increased employment opportunities in the urban
centers. This affects the foreign policy process in that
the Government must take into consideration the impact of
certain trade practices and policies on the so-called "de-
pressed areas," particularly in the former Soviet Zone.
This is one of the key factors for continuation of trade
9Charles A, Gulick, Austria from Hapsburg to Hitler
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), p. 552.
For a comprehensive review of the reforms, see ibid .
,
pp. 554-582.





relations with the Communist states, since these latter
states chiefly absorb the goods manufactured in Lower Aus-
tria* There are also associated social problems which
complicates the free movement of labor within the country
•
Several additional considerations include the high cost of
retraining labor and the necessity to maintain a productive
and diversified agriculture.
There has b&&n a less obvious change in the higher
echelons of the society. Over the years, there has been a
progressive deterioration in the economic position of some
elite groups. This has generally affected the academic pro-
12fession and the fields of the arts, science, and culture.
Because of unreasonably low compensation and lac:c of ade-
quate facilities, top individuals in these professions have
emigrated on their own initiative, leaving a void which
marks a decline in the liberal tradition » This steady flow
of migration has been maintained from Austria in recent
years.
This decline is clearly registered at the University
of Vienna. This institution was once world famous for its
distinguished faculty and overall academic excellence, par-
ticularly during the first three decades of this century.
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educators to be second-rate, possessing little of its former
eminence. This, unfortunately, characterizes the general
trend of Austrian education.
One remaining serious problem has been assimilating
into the national community the countless refugees that have
entered the country. As stated earlier, the number of
refugees passing through Austria since 1945 reached several
million. The bulk of those who remained in Austria have
been Volksdeutsche , or Germans from Central and Eastern
13
Europe. Although Austria, and Vienna in particular, had
always been a melting pot of many nationalities who had
migrated to Vienna during the Monarchy, the postwar immi-
grants have not adjusted easily to the new environment and
are, therefore, often troublesome. Collectively, the Volks-
deutsche have been dissatisfied with the coalition pattern,
13According to the July 25, 1959, issue of Austrian
Information , the refugees may be divided into four groups
:
1. The oldest embraced the refugees from the Iron Curtain
who during the Second World War had been deported as forced
laborers and who happened to be in Austria in 1945. This
number was once estimated at nearly a million, but has shrunk
to several thousand. 2. The second group consisted of
persons of German descent. Most were Danube Suabians and
Sudenten Germans. In 1951, there were 385,000 of which
350,000 ultimately assumed Austrian citizenship. 3. The
third group was composed of Hungarian refugees. About
130,000 Hungarians fled to Austria as a result of the 1956
Revolt. Of this number, about 10,000 still reside in Aus-
tria. 4. The final group were Yugoslavs who started to
arrive in 1957, and there are about 15,000 in the country
today. There were still some 30,000 refugees in 1964 on













and have been involved In the few industrial troubles that
have taken place in recent years,
III. THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS
Numerous associations in one way or another seek to
influence the foreign policy process in accordance with
their perceived interests. The fact that they are tightly
organized and able to achieve specific objectives for
limited constituencies necessitated their consideration.
The number and variety precluded, a comprehensive study;
instead, several representative organizations were surveyed
to gain an insight of their role. In general, religious
interests were represented by the Roman Catholic Church, and
economic groups were divided into labor and management
organizations., The critical role of the Volksdeutsche was
described above.
Austrian Federation of Trade Unions
Major interest groups in Austria tend to have direct
connections with a political party. The outstanding example
was the Socialist-dominated Austrian Federation of Trade
Unions, which on occasion has played a role in that party's
policy-making. Austria has one of the most comprehensive
and advanced systems of labor legislation in the world. It









nineteenth and twentieth centuries before most other
European states. In 1893, the first trade union congress
convened in Vienna, This led to the establishment of the
Trade Union Commission in 1909 and a strong stable labor
movement. Later, the large and powerful Austrian Federation
of Trade Unions (AFTU) emerged. It includes the former free
trade unions, which were concerned with finding a common
platform with the international workers' movement, and two
former trade associations s the Christian Journeymen and
the Christian Social Worker
Almost two-thirds of the some 2,225,000 gainfully
employed nationals are union members. The Austrian Federa-
tion of Trade Unions is a supra-party organization wit
sixteen constituent unions established on an industrial
basis. Although officially non-partisan contrasted to the
pre-civil war ideological and religious unions , the Austrian
Federation of Trade Unions is dominated by Socialists, com-
prising 70 per cent of the membership. The second strongest
group, representing 10 per cent of the membership, follows
the conservative philosophy of the People *s Party, The
Communist membership is about 7 per cent. The remaining
members belong either to splinter parties or consider
14Austrian Information (Kay 30, 1959), 3,
..





themselves to be independent. Membership in unions is still
voluntary.
The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions was described
in the Austrian Information as follows
:
It advocates a moderate, responsible program aimed
at raising the standard of living of its members
without jeopardizing the stability of the economy.
Its primary function is to negotiate collective
agreements with various industrial interests. Most of
its leaders are members of Parliament. It strongly
supports democracy and is an active member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) in Brussels. 15
There have been no general industrial strikes in
Austria since the end of the Second World War. A Communist
attempt to disrupt the economy over a wage agreement was
successfully foiled. As a result , most of the Communist
instigators were expelled from the Austrian Federate
Trade Unions. Strikes at the plant-level are infrequent.
The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions considers all strikes
illegal that are not first cleared with them and refuses
financial support for such wildcat strikes.
Occasionally, the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions
has become directly involved in attempts to influence foreign
policy. For example, in 1956, union members contributed
generously to assist Hungarian refugees » In February 195S,









Yugoslav Government protesting sentences imposed on former
16leading trade unionists*
Later that year, the Austrian Federation of Trade
Unions published a report entitled "International Trade
Unions and Economic Cooperation" written by Keina Kienzl,
Chairman of its Economic Department * The participation of
Austria in the European Free Trade Association was strongly
endorsed. In the same report , certain concessions were
advocated as vital—among them a recommendation for a three
year moratorium on tariff reductions so as to assist Austria
in maintaining full employment during the initial period*
Three factors were cited which were considered peculiar to
her position: the retarding effect of ten years of Allied
occupation on reconstruction, the unfavorable geographical
position as regards maritime commerce, and the economic
17problems caused by Soviet reparations* In the words of
Franz Olah:
We have more opportunities in the field of trade
licy as members of EFTA, than we would have in
a direct association with the ESC. It is undoubt-
edly a great advantage for us that our hands are
not tied in negotiations and the conclusions of
commercial treaties with third states. This is
of great importance for Austria in view of her
special situation* EFTA membership allows us to
16
Austrian Information (February 22, 1958), 2
1 7Ibid . (October 25, 1958), 5.






determine our foreign trade relations with coun-
tries to the East and also with any other state
in the world* Thus, we may open up for the Aus-
trian economy new markets » • * • X a .d
that the strength of trade unions will have,
through a sincere and successful cooperation
among EFTA countries, a preponderant influence
on a policy of full employment and on the efforts
of labor to obtain its due rewards. 18
Industrial Chambers
These Chambers are semi-governmental bodies with con-
siderable influence. The Chamber of Labox .ade up of
delegates elected by industrial workers and is mainly con-
cerned with formulating labor and social legislation* Any
proposed bill that might conceivably affect labor must be
submitted to this body for its comment and assent. Wage and
salary earners have a small percentage of their earnings
deducted automatically for the support of this agency.
The Federal Chamber of Trade and Commerce represents
industrial interests in a similar capacity, in that any
legislation must inevitably be submitted for negotiation and
compromise, if necessary. All Austrian enterprises ar
obligated by law to be members.
The Federal Chamber of Trade and Commerc ivided
into sections dealing with commerce; industry; trade,
finance, credit, and insurance; communications; and
tourist trade. The commerce section is subdivided
1
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into federal guilds and trade into federal corpora-
tions* The remaining sections are subdivided into
professional associations. There is also a Chamber
of Trade and Commerce in each F 'rovince, sub-
sided as above • *9
The Chamber has offices in sixty-six countries } as well as a
few honorary agencies.
The League of Austrian Manufacture
Founded in the fall of 1946, the League is con.
of more than three thousand manufacturing and industrial
enterprises. This is a continuation of a tradition estab-
lished under the Monarchy and carried over in the it
Republic of having a central organization t resent manu-
facturers. Membership in the League is voluntary. It ii
composed of the General Management, departments dealing with
trade, industry, finance, social relations, communic .*sj
and sections devoted to the Press and international organi-
20
zations. This organization seldom presents public resolu-
tions to influence the foreign policy of Austria.
Roman Catholic Church
Although Austria is predominantly .holic state
»
there is no direct connection between Stats an xch. The
People's Party is mainly Catholic, while some 30 per cent of
19
jl d., p. 104.
Austria , Facts and Figures , p. 1.
20.




the membership of the Socialist Party are practicing Catho-
21lies. The pressure from the Church is of potential influ-
ence but is currently only indirectly felt through its lay
members playing an active role in public life.
Bureaucracy
A large percentage of public officials owe their
employment directly to the dominant political parties. As
early as November 1947, the Coalition itself was formed in
proportion to party strength in Parliament. This procedure,
known as "proporz' ? or the distribution of public offie
according to the proportionate strength of the parties in
Parliament, is found at every level of the bureaucracy
•
The extent of propers was dramatized It .en
the Socialist Party acted indeper ly from its partn
the Kapsburg question. This matter product; irst open
split in the Coalition, although no drastic chanc lted«
Crown Prince Otto, pretender to the Austrian throne, was a
21
E» V* Kuehnett-Leddin, "Change in Austria,"
National Review (April 8, 1961) ? 214„
22Richard Hiscocks, an observer of postwar Austria,
writes in The Rebirth of Austria , that pr =n
transferred to the economic area* In the nationalised in-
dustries, state and city banks, in radio and
ties, even in all major private enterprise and cultural
fields, the division is nearly equal. To











boy when the Hapsburg Monarchy was overthrown, in the after-
math of the First World War. The House of Hapsburg had
ruled continuously in Austria since 1282. The new govern-
ment exiled the royal family and the Hapsburg Law was
enacted which banned their return until they renounced all
claims to the country and formally accepted the constitution*
Emperor Xarl died without changing his position.
Empress Zita set up a small court in Spain and still is un-
willing to accept the restrictions demanded. Otto was
educated at Belgium* s Louvain University and married Ger-
23
raany's Princess Regina of Saxe-Neiningen in 1951. Al-
though Otto has little sympathy for socialism, he did &gx
three years ago to the provisions of the Hapsburg Law and
sought to enter Austria. The Government refused his request
because of intensive Socialist opposition* The Administra-
tive Court upheld his declaration over the objections of t*
Government. The membership of the Peopled Party was willing
to abide by this decision, but the Socialists were not so
inclined. The latter took their case to Parliament and had
new legislation enacted which continued Otto's exile. Be-
cause of his willingness to compromise, former Chancellor
Gorbach received much criticism from within his own party
23






and ultimately resigned* Although both sides had an excuse
to break the coalition agreement, neither partner did.
In conclusion, there are no large groups in Austria
organized specifically to influence foreign policy. This
excludes the Institute for Economic Research, whose concern
is mainly research and which was mentioned later in the
study. Generally, interest groups, with the notable excep-
tion of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, do not
publicly present arguments designed to influen.. \m foreign
policy process. Many organized groups may be consulted off
the record, but this is a part of the decision-making
process about which exists little accurate information.
IV. THE ROLE OP POLITICAL PARTIES
AND POLITICAL PATTERNS
I °H*tia il Mov. ^\ . :^
The internal development of the star, the
Second World War has been characterized by a stability which
is unique in postwar Surop mh has £ ittern of
six peaceful national elections. Ti- ontrast
to the stormy heritage of the First Republic and constitut
significant progress toward making pari
work. One important change was cited by Dr« Reim .
Austrian parties have devel

B6
parties*" Ernest H. Buschbeck, in Austria , reviewed the
manner by which the political parties acquired dominant
roles in the country:
As on the occasion of the foundation of the Austrian
Republic in 1918, so on its re-emergence in 1945, the
parties did not grow naturally from the soil of exist-
ing parliamentary institutions. On the contrary, they
preceded the establishment of constitutional bodies
and it was they, as self-appointed spokesmen of the
public will, who created the institutional framework
of the state. This accounts for the tremendous weight
and importance, and the almost statutory position,
which the parties enjoy* 2!5
Herbert P# Secher distinguishes the major political
movements within the Austrian society:
It is possible to Identify three major political move-
ments in Austria that have perpet iemselv^
through over a half century and which have survive
in effect, three major changes in regime: Political
Catholicism, Democratic Socialism ar i-
alism represented, i :tively, in t lie
by the Christian Socials, the Social
Pan Germans; and during the Second Republic by t
Austrian People 1 s Party, the Social::
•called "Independents." A successful reconcilia-
tion of the demands issuing from these groups -
peasants, industrial workers, organized Catholi : .ity
and former National Soc kJ - has an, i. :.,
the major objective to which the Austrian coalition
policies have addressed themselves since the inception
of the Second Republic «26
James K, Pollock, Change and Crisis in European
.^^-^±r;n (Haw Storks Rinehartandi Company ,~T-hc , 194 7 )
,
p. 79*
25Ernest H. Buschbeck, Austria Ion: Oxford
University . .-), p. 236.
srfcert P* Secher, ''Austria's Survival," Contem-
porary Political Ideologies, ed, Joseoh S, Roue ' aterf.




In 1945 , the Allies only permitted candidates from
the People's Party, the Socialist Party, and the Communist
Party to participate. From among the ten parties that
entered the 1949 elections emerged the most important
splinter party to date-—the "Verband der Unabhaengigen"
—
Association of Independents. In succeeding elections, only
these four parties have heen able to elect delegates to
Parliament. Campaigns have been marked with restraint in
attacking foreign policy, since the Coalition partners are
jointly responsible for existing programs and policies.
Further, the opposition has been badly split and ineffective,
Although on the surface it ap that a multi-
party system exists in Austria, in reality only two part-
represent the majority of the electorate. The People*
s
and Socialist Parties are bot oxid regularly
receive between them more than four~fifths of the total
number of votes cast. The two parties received over 85 per
cent of the popular vote in 1962. S: cent of
eligible voters regularly participate in the national elec-
tions, this indicates a consensus which 1* consistently in
agreement with the Coalition.*"
or a different view,
Austrian Odyssey (London*. Macmillan and Company, Ltd*
,
1957), pp. 1^5-186. He contends that the ru.': jple
consists of being able to turn a government out, as well as
put it in; and short of voting for . an





Apart from a brief period following the Soviet lib-
eration of Vienna, these two parties have controlled the
political arena and shared public offices. The Communist
Party, which has never secured more than 5 per cent of the
popular vote, left the Coalition in November 1947, when the
lone Communist Minister Altmann resigned. Thus with wide-
spread public support, the parties have followed a moderate
course in foreign affairs* In avoiding support for extreme
parties, Anton Wildgans believes that:
History has taught Austrians service to an idea, a .
he had in mind the supranational and universal idea*
Both main political p
advocate a mediatory diid conciliatory role in inter-
national relations ,28
The major parties are formed along traditional
European lines, d it an
nature of the state and society* Richard Hisc ints
out that:
This fundamental contrast in Weltanschauun
philosophy of life, has heen one of tfc
for stability in party loyalties} people are less
likely to change al.. if religious convictions
and deep-rooted social attitudes are involved. 29
The contrast increases the dominance and rigidity of t
party organization in the political structur Voting is
carried out according to a system of proportional




representation and the closed party list, the whole state
being divided into no more than twenty-five electoral dis-
tricts • The voter does not select individuals, but rather
votes for a list of candidates selected by the leaders of
the party of his preference*
Since there is little, if any, personal contact be-
tween a member of Parliament and his cons tit i , the
legislator feels less a represen.. of the people than a
party official. The party maintains strict discipline and
determines his vote and actions,, A3 an individual, he is
not influential outside ;lufo. explains why
party meml. in Parliament - ige total support docilely
to party policies, and never vote with the opposition,.
The t irties have enforced a Coalition &§ .
which is the heart of the joint poli>r -ing arrant
Herbert Secher makes this observation - systh-
under the stress of t'i. World War II occupation
period these parties ... tal
system of joint policy-making under which no major
piece of legislation may
,
no major
istrative decision or appointments s by one coali-
tion partner without the consent of the
majority nor minority axe any Ion ary meaningful
terras as used in this Austrian
Any infraction of this working agreement is su
30Ibid ., p« 49.
31Secher, oja. cit
* , pp* 345
-
90
for the fall of the government. This results in a predeter-
mined result every time members of Parliament vote.
The question arises whether any democracy can stand a
total lack of visible strife, honest contradiction and com-
petition. Compromise, as a habit, means loss of vitality;
and, in the long run, no political party can survive without
the stimulus of competition. While there has been a con-
sistent foreign policy based on certain shared values such
as insuring neutrality, many leaders in both parties feel
that the Coalition has outlived its usefulness. There is
pressure in the People's Party for a harder line on the
Right which is matched by similar pressure by the Left wing
33
of the Socialist Party.
As a permanent arrangement, the coalition system con-
tains serious disadvantages. A great strain Is placed on
political sincerity when party membership is known to be the
key to office. Political opinions come to be main qualifi-
cations for appointments in which technical knowledge and
experience should count the most. Above all, the party
aspect of political life is continuously emphasized. This
can become a real threat to displace loyalty to the state.
32Hiscocks, op . cit * , p. 67,
33
"Centrifugal, n Economist (March 30, 1963), 1217.





Another problem is the stifling of leadership and adoption
of mediocre policies acceptable to both parties. This is
resulting in the gradual destruction of the sound principle
of personal responsibility.
There are four national political parties. These are
the People's, Socialist, Liberal, and the Austrian Communist
Party, in order of their importance. As previously described,
only the first two exercise dominant roles in the foreign
policy process.
People's Party
This party was established in 1945 as the successor
to the moderate right Christian Social Party, While the
party has consistently polled the greatest popular vote and
held a slim majority in the Nationalrat since 1945, it has
been unable to elect a President* In the 1962 political
campaign, former Chancellors Gorbach and Figl, either of
whom might have successfully challenged incumbent President
Schaerf , were unwilling to accept the nomination. This
resulted in a major defeat for the late Julius Raab, who
received only 40 per cent of the popular vote.
The party represents conservative elements in the
nation and is composed of the strong middle class. Organ-
ized into three federations; farmers, businessmen, and








membership is largely Catholic, although the party is offi-
cially non-denominational* It emphasizes patriotism, advo-
cates free enterprise, and is a resolved opponent of
Communism, The party desires to promote the creation of new
private property and favors savings activities, especially
in the form of public loans and bonds along with large-
scale investments to keep the economy moving. The creation
of a larger economic area in Europe is advocated, since this
will offer small enterprises new possibilities of develop-
32
ment. Finally, it favors expansion of international trade
with some protection of domestic industries*
The current leaders are Federal Chancellor Joseph
Klaus and Party Secretary General Hermann Withalm. At the
Party Convention on September 20, 1963, Dr. Klaus was
elected party leader which represented the culmination of
efforts of a reform group that had challenged Dr. Gorbach's
policy of accommodation with the Socialists. Dr. Klaus had
resigned earlier as Finance Minister to demonstrate his dis-
satisfaction with the Coalition's easy fiscal policies.
Although content to wait until the scheduled national elec-
tions, Dr. Klaus desires a greater share in the Government
to reflect the majority of his party in Parliament.






The Socialist Party, founded in 1889, was previously
known as the Social Democratic Party. Austrian socialism
has two roots: identification with the reformist tradition
of the German Social Democratic Party and a radical philoso-
phy based upon a literal translation of Marx*s concepts
*
Herbert Secher points out that:
In the post-World War I era, the Austrian Social
Democracy had often been regarded as the theoreti-
cal as well as political link between Western
Socialism and Soviet Communism, At that time, having
foresworn all participation in the national government
by retiring into "permanent opposition," the party,
through the capture of the city government of Vienna,
could there engage in the most extensive and bene-
ficial practices of peaceful economic and social
changes ... while pursuing nationally an orthodox
Marxist-revolutionary line, 33
Robert T. Bower, in Communications and Public Opinion in
Austria , agrees with this analysis:
These men [Socialists] worked and argued for universal
suffrage, adult education, and a comprehensive health
program, rather than planning for a revolution. 34
When the party was reconstituted in 1945, after
eleven years of persecution, its basic ideology had changed.
Herbert Secher states:
3 3Secher, op. cit
. ,
p. 355. For the prevailing Aus-
trian conception of Marxism, see Gulick, op, cit., pp. 436-
439, 1363-1400.
34Robert T. Bower, Communications and Public Opinion
in Austria
,
prepared by the Bureau of Social Science Re-
search, The American University (Washington: The American
University, 1954), p. 63,
;£§£*CIVC
.
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The leading personnel of the party was composed of
men who had remained largely untainted by contact
with the former discredited radicals. To be sure,
the link with Austro-Marxism was acknowledged, but-
more from a sense of historical courtesy than from
a real desire to continue in this ideological direc-
tion.35
The Socialist Party advocates the free development of
the individual which requires the establishment of a mixed
national economy, shared between public and private inter-
ests. Socialists intend to reach this objective peacefully
through economic planning and state control of essential
industries. There is the desire to integrate key enter-
prises into a serai-public economic system and subordinai.
the influence of management in the economic and administra-
tive sectors for the common good. A wide range of freedom
will provide the scope necessary for the initiative of
private enterprise and for competition since the Socialists
intend to protect private property earned by work in the
36
agricultural and small business branches.
Socialists believe in independence and neutrality
vis-d-vis all military alliances ; active cooperation in
international organizations such as the United Nations;
recognition of the contractual rights of the former Austrian
population in the South Tyrol, and the implementation of
Secher, oj>. cit
• , p. 357.




37these rights in the spirit of true Suropean understanding.
Further, the party opposes Communism and plays down Marxism.
While the two parties differ considerably on economic policy,
both are in basic agreement with regard to continuing
Austria's foreign policy along present lines.
The Socialist Party has the support of urban-organized
labor and the lower middle class « Its hold on the tra
unions has prevented the growth of Communism. It has in
every postwar election received the second largest popular
vote and elected both Presidents, The leadership consists
of Vice Chancellor and Party Chairman Bruno Pitterman,
Transportation Minister and Party Secretary Otto Probst, and
Party Secretary Alois Piperger*
Liberal Party
The Liberal or Freedom Party is of some significant
by controlling eight seats in the Hationalrat, which is the
minimum number required to introduce legislation* It was
organized in 1956 as the successor to the League of Inde-
pendents which had b^en dissolved that April* The party is
structured along lines similar to the former German National
Socialist Party. Highly critical of the Government, the
Liberal Party has been hampered by pursuing a program of












opposition solely for its own merit. Finally, it receives
more support in local than national elections , having he&n
effectively isolated amid the overwhelming trend favoring
moderate domestic and foreign policies.
Aui.trian Communist Party
The Communist Party is the lone major supranational
organization in the country. There has been widespread
reluctance by the people to embrace such movements since the
1934 civil war. The Party has never been successful since
its establishment in 1918* Forced underground by the Doll-
fuss Ban of May 1933, its Party leaders fled to the Soviet
3Union when the Germans entered in 1938. Conspicuous among
Western European Communist parties because of its meager
support in early postwar elections, it has continued to be
unsuccessful in the last two general elections. Ilany politi-
cal experts thought that the Communists would tern able to
elect a few delegates in 1959, but memory of the Hungarian
Revolt helped to hand them a total defeat* In 1962, the
Communists received less than 3 per cent of the popular vote
and most of this was collected in industrial centers.
The government has shown concern over Communist ac-
tivities and has heen effective in checking its potential
threat to domestic order* As mentioned earlier, the
38Shepherd, op. cit




government expelled from the country in 1956 the Communist-
controlled World Federation of Trade Unions* Austrian
authorities clearly recognized that the operations of this
front agency endangered diplomatic relations with the West,
particularly the United States.
Austrian Communists advocate the creation of a
"People's Democracy," without defining that goal. Besides
opposing most governmental action, Communists campaign for
further nationalization of industry, land reforms, and
broader social welfare. The Party has opposed military pr
paredness, attacks the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
and seeks complete political, economic and ideology neu-
IItrality in the Cold War struggle. In the ideological
split between the Soviet Union and Communist China, it
actively supports the former.
The leaders include Party Chairman Koplenig, F«
Honner and F. Fuernbergj the latter two having entered the
country from Yugoslavia, where they fought in the Second
World War. It was concluded that, while small, the Commu-
nist Party has experienced leadership and the support of the
Soviet Government. Although the Communist * insignifi-
cant influence on governmental policy formulation, care must
39Walter K. Mailory, Political Handbook and Atlas of
the World (New York: Harper and Row Company, 1963)
,
p. lTT






be exercised in appraising their continuing threat to the
state.
3,: lint^i Parties
In addition, there are various splinter parties,
which have succeeded in capturing less tnan 1 per cent of
the vote combined in any general election. The newest group
is the European Federalist Party which was formed shortly
before the 1962 elections. The party was unable to elect
any delegates and has no power in government. The major
characteristics of splinter parties are their local charac-
ter, narrow outlook, and lack of organization. The follow-
ing six parties have yet to elect their first delegate to
the Nationalrat: the Ergocratic Party y Free Workers' Move-
ment of Austria, the Austrian Middle Class Party, Austrian
Patriotic Union, Parliamentary Representation of those




Elite factions which influence the foreign policy
process are found in several distinct occupational fields.
The principal government officials including those in the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs constitutes the first group,
the role of which will be discussed in Chi- VII. A






Another faction is composed of high caliber economists,
working in a small semi-official institution—the Institu-
tion for Economic Research. This autonomous agency is
sponsored by many organizations, including unions, political
parties, and the government.
The staff, headed by Professor Franz Nemschak, con-
sists of twenty economists who deal with specialized matters
of common concern to many branches of the government.
Monthly reports are issued which cause frank debates within
elite circles,, All foreign economic questions bx- .rst
analyzed by the Institution, from which emerges recommenda-
tions for appropriate action by the government. Concerning
the pending application for association with the European
Economic Community, Professor Nemschak has stated;
Unless association is reached, Austria will be forced
into more bilateral trade c,
increased government planning, low productivity, and
eventual loss of political freedom and ir '0
The leaders of the People's Party have accepted this concl
sion wholeheartedly, but many Socialists hav ious
reservations even though supporting the Coalition's request
for negotiations with the European Economic Community.
The intellectuals may be conven / cla
belonging to one of three political societ which fl
41 Henry Haslitt, "One World or Many?,"
(October 7, 1963), 95.













centered around a political publication. In general terms,
these debating groups have been organized for over a decade,
but only within the last two years have they been able to
Influence seriously the highest public officials. They are
in constant contact with all levels of the bureaucracy.
Finally, most solicit contributors from other political fac-
tions to participate in open debate.
The Socialist faction is concentrated around Die
~ukunf
t
, the ideological monthly of the Socialist Party.
Open discussions are permitted to help reach decisions.
Intellectuals, both inside and outside of the fra -k of
party machinery, are invited to participate. One issue
has been handled, it is published in the party press and no
official dissent is tolerated.
The second group centers around Furche , the ideologi-
cal weekly of the People* s Party. This faction represents
t Catholicism in the party. Hatters of fundamental doc-
trine are debated within this group, which includes the most
respected party intellectuals.
The final group may be placed between the preceding
two, and is composed of right-wing Socialist sympathizers.
They support the monthly publication of Forum . Among its
principal contributors is Guenther Nenning, author of








These diverse groups have prepared and educated a
whole generation of political writers within the Coalition
who have large followings. The debates on ideology have
created a real stir this year, since the intellectuals have
sensed the opportunity to expand th^ir influence. It is
important to note that these groups have had an overall con-
ciliatory effect upon the Coalition by resolving internal
political differences.
Mass Communications
With a low illiteracy rate, common language, and
modern press and communications facilities, the nation h
well informed about foreign affairs, but unable to influence
foreign policy directly because few issues are brought be-
fore the voters for their action. The most basic point to
note about Austria's mass media is their national character.
Strictly local and provincial newspapers are minor in rela-
tion to the media centered in Vienna. The Austrian audience
is essentially national for newspapers, magazines, radio and
television. Opinion on foreign policy is formed nationally
and not regionally.
The government controls all radio and talevis:
broadcasting. With this monopoly, the government is able to
manage the news in a way that avoids outright conflict




ends, the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor appear separately
on radio to describe briefly the political action of each.
There is little commentary on foreign policy outside of
these prepared presentations.
A few general impressions about the contents of news-
papers and magazines are in order. The contest for the
attention of the readi/. ubll.es is intense with thirty-five
daily newspapers being published six days a week. The
dailies do not publish on Mondays, and there are six so-
called "Monday papers" published to fill the voi .se
are similar to community papers serving local areas in the
United States.
Impartiality in Austrian radio and television con-
trasts sharply with partisan attachments on the part of
press. The majority oi - es are either directly
trolled party organs, or are all rx some wa> /ie of
41the parties, It is a common practice of the Communist
press, as well as other party-affiliated newspapers, to
handle news almost like editorials. On the other hand,
41The people normally read newspapers supported by
the party of their choice. For details, |p. cit .
,
pp. 69-75. The report concludes that dailies are read by
more men. and weeklies by women; dailies have a px
.
nantly urban, weeklies a rural, readership; and those with
lower incomes prefer local sections of the dailies, and t
weekly sheets. In general, business circ' non-







feature material does not appear in the daily newspapers to
as great an extent as in the United States; it is considered
n,ore appropriate to weefcXy newspapers ana magazines.42
In conclusion, Austria's mass media are important
el- tits in the foreign policy process, chiefly in providing
the rapid means of transmitting knowledge about events among
the various elements in the process. A large majority of
Austrians can be rapidly exposed to the government's view as
to the significance of foreign policy developments. Finally,
the press supplements existing itra-governmental
communication, informing policy-makers in all branches of
government of current policies. The nature of intra*
governmental relations is discussed next.
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There has been a reversal in the traditionally
dependent legislative-executive relationship in Austria*
The legislative branch has been relegated to a forum, while
the executive branch has expanded its power and obtained the
initiative in the policy-making process • Insignificant con-
stitutional authority is available for Parliament to curb
the actions of the Executive. Although the Chancellor and
Cabinet are technically responsible to the Mationalrat, it
has been shown earlier that this legislative power has fee
negated by the political pattern. On the other hand, the
Chancellor has emerged as the dominant figure in the entire
foreign policy process.
The authority of the executive branch is found in t
Coalition Committee and Cabinet. The Chancellor serves as
the head of the Cabinet and exercises broad powers, even
though individual ministers have primary j Lction and
responsibility for their respective ministries* Differences
within this branch are settled in secret sessions,, Whenever
&A3 ill Ua:^/ss b nsc.d *£ri
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compromise has been deemed impossible, the government has
resigned; which means that the same people must once again
negotiate with one another, with approximately the same
strength held in Parliament,
Parliaments Indirect Role
Austrian postwar political innovations have had the
effect of limiting the authority of Parliament to voting the
budget estimate, without, however, the right to control
expenditures or the actions of the executives in any field.
The absence of legislative controls has reduced the legisla-
ture to performing a mechanical role with no option for
dissent. Foreign policy is not conceived as the product of
legislative deliberation but rather as a matter for approval
after it has been submitted by the Government, Richard
Hiscocks expresses this predicament:
Since 1945, the Lower House [Nationalrat 3 has not
initiated any basic decisions, and has seldom re-
shaped them in debate. It is neither the source
nor molder of policy, but merely the formal seal
of democracy stamped on a steady stream of com-
promise edicts worked out by the Coalition
managers. The function of the Upper Hom.
[Bundesrat] may be described as putting the red
ribbon on the seal, in twelve years it did not
reject a single measure submitted to it #2
'•Parliament Seeks Increased Powers," The New York
Times, Match 26, 1961*
2Richard Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (London:
Oxford University Press, linTS)
,
p. 186.







This is indicative of the "milquetoast" character of Parlia-
ment*
Parliament can neither fashion nor reflect public
opinion, since there is little contact between the people
and their elected representatives* It is clear that the
legislative procedure is of an impersonal nature. This is
increased by the rule requiring certain proposed legislation
to be initially submitted to chambers, which represent sec-
tional interest groups. In the case of legislation whole-
heartedly approved by the interests concerned, the subsequent
3parliamentary proceedings tend to lose in significance*
In an attempt to increase its meager role in foreign
affairs, Parliament created, in 1956, a Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee to work closely with those charged with conducting
Austria's foreign policy. The Foreign Minister now submits
duplicate reports on foreign relations to that body and the
Cabinet* The Foreign Affairs Committee meets weekly in
closed session*
A few years later, the Austrian Government copied the
British House of Commons question hour, during which time
government officials are more or less required to reply to
4inquiries* These exchange sessions help to bind the two
3Hiscocks, 0£* cit • , p* 50*








branches closer together, but the broader relationship per-
sists* In 1963, Parliament potentially acquired more power
as the result of a quarrel between the Coalition parties
•
Both agreed to permit a free vote in the Chambers on meas-
ures
,
after a certain time, on which the Cabinet cannot
5
agree* Prior to this concession, the parties did not
interfere on votes which concerned issues not directly
related to basic policies*
It is concluded that while the legislative branch is
dependent upon the executive branch in most instances, that
it is quietly seeking to expand its influence* Open tension
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The Chancellor is the active head of government and
is held legally responsible by Parliament for all actions of
the Austrian Government. He is the dominant figure in all
policy decisions concerning foreign relations, since the
President is only a titular figure. Although the extent of
any leader »s power is curtailed by the coalition pattern,
5





the office of Chancellor has become the most prominent one
in the foreign policy process for several obvious reasons.
First, as elected leader of the political party with
a majority in Parliament, he controls a formidable bloc of
votes. He consults with the President in all important
appointments, and his recommendations are always accepted.
Candidates for cabinet posts are jointly reviewed and
approved by these two officials, in order to promote harmony
in the new administration. The Chancellor must pursue a
policy which will create trust within the opposition, while
retaining the loyalty of his own colleagues.
Second, his role as Chairman of the Cabinet is impor-
tant in that he controls and leads all discussions. In a
sense, he is the first among equals. It is his task to
introduce to the Cabinet for further public consumption, the
majority of agreements secretly reached by the Coalition
Committee, Although he cannot exercise a formal veto, it is




Under the prevailing system, often the real authority
is not exercised by the Chancellor and Cabinet, but by a











basis. This body is composed of fourteeen politicians,
equally divided between the ruling coalition parties. All
but one representative of the People's Party hold public
office* It can be seen that this is a fluid personal
arrangement, both inside and outside of the government. It
is outside, not only because of its membership but also
because official decision-making channels are often not
utilized until after the decision has been reached. In
addition to these permanent members, interested ministers
and officials are invited to participate, depending upon the
scope and nature of the issues under consideration. Thus,
the Committee becomes the supreme executive, and in a sense
an inner cabinet.
Each side gives its views and attempts to keep all
controversies within the committee. The majority of inter-
departmental disputes are settled here. The result of the
meetings is transmitted to the Cabinet for implementation.
In rare cases, Parliament might be given an opportunity to
break a deadlock. A widespread popular consensus for the
coalition system permits this informal apparatus to -work.
People trust their government and do not keep a close watch
on its actions.
The powers of this committee cover the entire field
of political action from fundamental policy formulation to
specific legislative bills. Its influence on the legislature
.CiSfioa-i.,




is total. With this committee s approval, no important
piece of legislation may be submitted to Parliament* Its
approval automatically guarantees a bill's enactment because
of the instructed party vote.
One problem with this concept was reflected in the
spring of 1963. It took eighteen weeks to re-establish the
Coalition, which was finally sworn in on March 23, 1963.
Since both sides must agree on all proposed legislation,
stalemates are frequent, and it is generally an awkward
arrangement. It has, in conclusion, appeared that t~
actual process of policy formulation and enactment has devel-
oped differently than that stipulated in the Constitution.
IV. MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS-
OTHSR MINISTRI
There is present the normal rivalry which occurs
between competing governmental agencies with different tech-
nical goals and constituents. Originally, all of the
Federal Ministries were either offices or departments under
the central Office of the Federal Chancellor. There are
also involved political considerations: the Foreign Minis-
ter is a Socialist, while the Ministries of National Defense,
Finance, and Trade are headed by Conservatives.











This conflict has been most visible in the pending
Austrian application for Associate Keabership in the
European Economic Community. This clash has not h&en offset
by the coalition arrangement which places the Secretaries of
State second in charge administratively of the other politi-
cal party. For example, the State Secretary in the Foreign
Ministry is restricted to exercising only those powers
7
explicitly delegated to him by the Foreign Minister, He is
seldom invited to attend cabinet and Coalition Committee
meetings
•
listry of National Defers
There are weekly meetings between these two minis-
tries on the ministerial level. Generally, communications
tend to be one sided, from the Foreign Ministry to the
Defense Kinistry. This stems from the fact that the Minis-
try of National Defense is primarily a recipient agency for
implementing policies, rather than for recommending courses
of action as a pressure group.
The defense forces are officially and in practice
non-partisan. This follows the general pattern in Western
democratic states of prohibiting political power to the
military. Considering these two factors, it is concluded
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that the Ministry of National Defense and the military
establishment, in general, exercise little, if any, direct
influence upon the foreign policy process • However, there
is little doubt that the military does exert indirect power
as a large employer and customer of domestic products,
Ministry of Finance
The Finance Ministry has a small staff which main-
tains relations with the Foreign Ministry through the
latter* s budgetary division. Monthly meetings are held
between the Finance Ministry and the rest of the cabinet
members to discuss fiscal matters. Since the budget is
small, every effort is made to operate in a clearly- ied
and operationally-feasible context,
Austria has begun contribu to the economic prog-
ress of the developing nations in Africa and Asia. The need
for close coordination in controlling official contributions
has helped to overcome political differences between various
department heads. In 1961, Austria devoted approximately 1
per cent of her budget for foreign aid. Official net con-
tributions amounted to $2,2 million and consisted of $0,5




The Flow of Financial Resources to Developi.-.
tries in 196J (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Information Service, 1963), p. 31. In a<
tion to official contributions, the Government guaranteed
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Ministry of Trade and Reconstruction
In November 1962, the Conservatives won a narrow but
significant victory in the national elections. Chancellor
Gorbach, under pressure of a strong reform movement within
his party, tried to force Socialist Foreign Minister Kreisky
to resign. Unsuccessful in this maneuver, he later proposed
that the Foreign Ministry* s responsibility for European
economic affairs be transferred to a new ministry where one
of his colleagues would pursue the Conservative approach.
As a final compromise, the Economic Policy Section of the
Foreign Ministry was transferred to the Trade Ministry,
which was under the control of the People's Party. Thus,
all foreign trade came under the jurisdiction of the Trade
Ministry.
Coordination between these two ministries is achieved
through the Division for Economic Coordination in the
Office of the Federal Chancellor* This division settles all
disputes and presents a common policy for foreign audiences.
This is necessary because in many technical matters con-
cerning other states , tha cognisant minister has authority
to negotiate directly in the name of the government.
private export credits to a large number of countries. The
total net increase amounted to $15,6 million in 1961,
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The fiscal year is the calendar year. The Ministers
submit their annual budget requests to the Finance Ministry
in late spring. These are consolidated and a rough draft
is prepared in early summer for circulation throughout the
government. In the following fiscal discussions, every
attempt is made to balance the budget* The Finance Minister
works with a fixed ceiling imposed by the Coalition Commit-
tee. Guidelines used in recent years have included restrict-
ing governmental projects to only major investments and to
9
refraining from any further increase in the national debt.
The final budget is sent to each ministry before
being submitted to Parliament* The Constitution obliges the
Government to submit the draft to Parliament, not later than
ten weeks before the end of the current financial year.
Every year before the official adoption of the budget, the
Finance Minister gives his report on the budget and a review
of economic progress to the Ways and Means Committee and to
the Plenary Session of the Nationalrat.
The estimates are then referred to the Budget Commit-
tee where they are discussed in detail for about four weeks.
After they have passed the committee stage, they are




referred back to the Plenary where they are again fully dis-
cussed. As a result of this process, the estimates are
usually approved on or about December 15, Amendments to the
estimates are possible at all of these stages.
This procedure does not constitute an obstacle to the
executive branch, since the submission of the report and the
budget estimates are formalities done to comply with the
technical provisions of the Constitution* Should Parliament
not have approved by December 31, the budget estimates or a
provisional budget, the Constitution has the further stipu-
lation that the previous budget should be applied during t
first two months of the new year*
The factors which influence the political process
have been analyzed. Since foreign policies are in a con-
stant process of formulation and implementation, the next
chapter is devoted to the . misation for foreign policy-
making. The role and pc £ the executive and legislative
branches of the government are discu.
til
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CHAPTER VII
ORGANISATION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I, CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
According to Article One of the Constitution of
October 1, 1920, "Austria is a democratic federal republic*
i
Its pov/ers are derived from t : ' Further, the
federal state consists of the following provinces: Burgen-
land, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg,
Styria, Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and Vienna* The great diversity
and the local needs of the provinces are taken into consid-
eration. Each province has an elected assembly (Landtag)
and an elected governor (Landeshauptraann) who is both tl.
premier for the autonomous provincial administration and the
chief local official c central administration*
Rights of Citizenship
The basic rights of Austrian citizens were formulated
under the Dual Monarchy in the Statute of December 21, 1867,
which still forms a part of the present constitution* This
statute incorporates the principle that "all citizens are
1For the text of the Austrian Constitution, see Amos
J* Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations (seconc nj





equal before the law, that makes no distinction with regard
2
to birth, sex, status, class, or religion*" Further, all
public offices are open to all citizens,
Austrian citizens are guaranteed the following funda-
mental rights;
1, Equality before the law
2* Access to public office
3. Freedom of movement for persons and their prop-
erty
4. Inviolability of property
5. Freedom of residence and to choose own domicile
6. Abolition of any kind of subjection
7* Personal freedom
S. Inviolability of domestic rig;
9* Secrecy of correspond®**
10
•
Freedom to meet and assc* .
11. Freedom of science and t ng
12* Freedom of speech
13 Freedom to choose own p. .ion
14, Freedom of worship an
15. Uquality before the law as regards ethnic groups
16* Right of petition.^
Federal Authority
Under the Constitution of 1920, the influence of tl
President on federal legislation and tw is
limited* The stress on the singular importanc tar
House of Parliament, and its dominance over th cutive
branch, was partly due to the political philosophy of the
2Austria , Facts and Figures
, p* 15*W i n » I I ' w i n iiiih iii ii« I Mm i m Ml i iinn I ? "
Friedrlch Hoser (ed*), Short Review of Social an
Working Conditions of EmployedHfter"son's 'in Austria (Vienna:




Social Democrats, whose views were then ascendant. This
party laid great emphasis on the necessity for concentrating
power in one democratically elected Chamber. * The severe
limitations of this arrangement were many, and finally
action was taken to redress the balance of power in the
government. The constitutional reform of 1929 was an
attempt to give the executive branch more control over the
actions of the government. Richard Hiscocks points outs
Even these reforms were limited to those on which
the t irties could agree, owing to the rule
that any constitutional change required approval by
a two-thirds majority.-^
The reforms did establish the procedure for the popular
election of the Pi ant. Nevertheless.
this public leader remained tightly controlled by t.'.
political parties.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government
in conducting the state's foreign affairs is enumerated in
Article Tcn u According to Section T ' this article
,
legislative and executive power in r« to foreign affair
including political and economic representation abroad, and
especially the conclusion of political treaties, the
ary MacDonald , The Republic of Austria 1918-1934 , A
Study in the Failure of Democratic Government (London:
6xford™TFniversity Press ,* 194G)
,
';:•," 13,
5Richard Hiscocks, The Rebirth of Austria (London:
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limitation of boundaries, and the conduct of foreign trade
is vested solely in the federation.
The Constitution expressly preserves the principle
that the judicial branch must be kept separate and independ-
ent from the other branches of government. This led to the
establishment of the Constitutional Court, which is the
highest court in the country* It is composed of Judges who
are not subjected to the government's instructions. Further,
this independence is safeguarded by the proviso that these
judges may be neither dismissed nor transferrer
The Second Austrian Republic is administered according
to the Constitution and existing laws* The chief executive
powers are vested in the Federal President and t'r. aral
Ministers, The major legislative powers are vested in the
Mationalrat, the Lower House of Parliament*
II* FEDERAL PRESIDENT
Power
The Federal President is the '© is
elected for a six-year term by direct m t ballot.
Re-election is permissible only once* He receives an oath
of allegiance from each of the nine provincial governors*
While his constituted powers >road in scope, his
actual authority is meager. The President has judicial
powers, such as appointing federal judges to the various
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courts. In the legislative area, he has the power to con-
voke or prorogue either House of the Parliament. In addi-
tion, he can dissolve the Nationalrat, but not more than
once for the same reason. He has the constitutional pre-
rogative to accept or refuse a government's resignation,
which former President Schaerf exercised once in refusing to
6
accept the resignation of Chancelli cbach's Government,.
All legislation must be submitted to himj and one signs
a bill, it becomes law.
The Constitution provides that the execut mr
shall be vested in the President and be exer
through him directly or officers subordinate to him* In
practice, tin ..-cutiv *er is exerd. . . .lly by
the Chancellor* -it has t ;<f appointment
or ssal of the Chancellor and, at the latter *s sugges-
tion, the other ministers. This r also . to all
other appointive positions within t .vern: including
diplomatic agents. He is to I. .. pt informed by th. .n-
cellor of all administrative decisions : Inet.
nally, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of t*
Austrian Armed Forces.
As Head of State, he is formally in chc,.. conduct-
ing foreign .. Lrs« He r< nts the si onial









capacity and receives and accredits diplomatic envoys. He
appoints ambassadors, and may conclude treaties and agree-
ments with other states, which then are subject to approval
by the Mationalrat. A final role is that of ratifying all
7treaties.
The President is indirectly involved with the conduct
of foreign affairs through his appointive powers. Although
his power might be increased through using special emergency
powers , he usually acts on the authority of the government.
The Sarelqii Hinist /orking in conjunction with the Chan-
cellor, has the direct responsibility for the smooth opera-
tion of the foreign policy process.
Incumbents
There has be&n a unique political pattern in the
short span of the Second Republic* There have heen three
presidents, all members of the Socialist Party, The first
was the veteran Socialist leader, Dr. Karl Rentier, who was
selected by the first Parliament. National elections we:
not held because of the then chaotic domestic environment.
After President Renner c La office in 1951, he was
succeeded by Dr. Theodor Koerner, "who later became the first
president to be elected by a popular majority in Austrian
Presidential powers in international affairs are
outlined in Ax~ticle G5 of the titution*
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history. Although it is provided in the amended Constitu-
tion of 1929 for the direct election of the president, those
in the past had been elected by the Nationalrat. With the
unexpected death of President Koerner on January 4, 1957,
the Socialist Party nominated its leader, Adolf Schaerf.
During the preceding postwar period, Schaerf had served as
Vice Chancellor and Socialist Party Chairman. He won the
1957 national elections with 51 per cent of the total vote.
He was re-elected by a larger margin on April 28, 1963, to
become the first president to ever serve a second term. It
will be interesting to observe whether the President seeks
to increase his authority by appealing to the political
leaders to better use his experience.
Upon assuming the highest office, all incumbents have
renounced their active political roles in the Socialist
Party and declared themselves above politics, in turn, the
newly-elected Socialist leader has heten appointed to the
position of Vice Chancellor to work closely with the Chan-
cellor. While the President is normally kept out of politi-
cal debates, he is still .4 by the general public as
the political leader of his party. President Schaerf has
risen above party politics in practice and is widely





The real political leader of the government is the
Chancellor. He holds the highest appointive office in the
government, usually serving a four-year term. According to
the terms of the Constitution, the President may appoint
whom he wishes t but, in practice, he only confirms the
appointee of the party with the strongest representation in
the newly-elected Parliament* That individual is given the
task of forming the new government*
In creating the new government, all important posi~
tions are share en th. a coalition parties. tti
President appoints the ten cabinet with approval
the Chancellor. These ministers m political appointees
and, therefore, a,. -ply committee to their i .etive
parties. The Constitution stipe, that th< xlor
and other minis; i actions
not possess the confidence of th<& majority of deputies
the Nationalrat. The < cabinet ministers is that of
the duration of the government and automatically expires
with a national election.
The Chancellor then makes an inaugural decla on in
the Hationalrat, which contains an outlir* _»ign
policy which will be pursued. This policy has the prior
... .: ijj
-'
1approval of the coalition committee and cabinet where una-
nimity is required for adoption* Both the policy declara-
tion an tical appointments are subjected to the
formality of endorsement by a majority in the Mationalrat*
A weakness of joint policies is that only the least contro-
versial ,-i.n bipartisan support, and important
questions are often excluded. This fosters a decision-
making environment in which the policy-makers are unwilling
to commit themselves to new programs and policies*
The position of the Chancellor in the cabinet is that
of its chairman. Since the general outline of foreign
policy is cone in the cabinet f this places the Chan-
.lor in the key 3 in the foreign policy process* This
position is strengthened by his power over the legislative
branch, as the active leader of the political party with the
strongest representation in Parliament. can control
legislation including foreign policy matters. The n^t
result £ ancellor emerges as the most powerful
figure in a structu- at favors the system over the leader*
The
-utive branch of the Austrian
Government may be found in Appendix ,
Th- ~llor is char .institution to take
over unctions of th any reason, t:
pre-.. ;rarily un- to discharge his dutit-:.











already occurred twice, Parliament must set the date for the
election of a new president* The inauguration of the presi-
dent terminates an interim period in which the Chancellor is
the Head of State.
Since the People*® Party has held a majority in
Parliament in the postwar period, their nominees have con-
secutively held this office. The current Chancellor is
Joseph Klaus who succeeded Or* Gorbach on April 2, 19€
Gorbach had replaced the late Julius Raab, who succeeded t!
first postwar Chancellor, Dr. Figl.
IV. FOREIGN MINISTER
The Foreign Minister is appointed by the President
with the consent of the Chancellor. Unlike members of the
United States Cabinet who are responsible to the American
President, Austrian ministers are not directly under the
control of the Chancellor. Instead, they are responsible to
the Nationalrat for the conduct of their respective minis-
tries, through a law stating that a minister can be im-
peached if he receives a no confidence vote in Parliament.
In effect, ministers are really under party control, since
Parliament acts only on instructions from the party bosses.
This relationship places Chancellor Klaus in an
uneasy position. Since the Foreign Minister is a member of








in the Foreign Ministry through the State Secretary, a mem-
ber of his party* While, in practice, the present arrange-
ment is tolerable because of the coalition agreement, the
potential remains for an extremely difficult line of command
should either coalition partner so choose* The Chancellor
does retain a dominant role in settling inter-ministerial
problems and has the respect of the Foreign Minister.
The Foreign Minister is involved with the formulation
of all major policies through his active and continuous
membership in the coalition committee* Basic ideas are ex-
changed in this committee, and issues are decided by a
simple majority vote. Since the composition of this extra-
parliamentary body is evenly proportioned, this amounts to
mutual agreement by the two parties. Once again, this is a
reflection of the true nature of the political structure. As
in the case of the Chancellor himself, the personality, ex-
perience, and qualifications of the Foreign Minister play an
important part in determining the role he performs in the




Following the general pattern of limited changes at
the higher levels of government, Or* Bruno Kreisky is the
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He succeeded Dr. Leopold Figl, who was appointed President
of the Austrian Parliament in the summer of 1959. itfhen Dr.
Kreisky assumed his duties, the post was as head of the
Foreign Office , which was still in the Federal Chancellery.
Dr. Kreisky joined the Socialist Party while enrolled
as a student at thQ University of Vienna. He went under-
ground after the party was prohibited, as one of its most
active members. He was arrested in 1935 and sentenced to
sixteen months imprisonment on charges of illegal political
8
activity. Again arrested, this time by the Gestapo, he was
expelled from the country in 1938. He took up residency in
Stockholm from 1939 to 1945, where he became an adviser to
the Swedish Government on Austrian problems*
After his return to Vienna, Dz* Kreisky joined the
Foreign Service. Subsequently, he was transferred to the
Austrian Embassy in Stockholm, and later assigned to the
Office of the Austrian President. He was appointed State
Secretary in the Office of Foreign Affairs in 1953 and was
elected to Parliament three years later.
The Foreign Minister is intimately associated with
the inner functioning of the ministry, the organisational
structure of which is outlined in Appendix 3. As a career
diplomat and politician, Dr. Kreisky recognises the use-
fulness of utilizing the chain of command, both up and down
8
Austrian Information (July 25, 1959), 3.
KMdfcf




the line. Thus, the Foreign Minister consults daily the
section heeds*
His role in the policy process is s&en more clearly in
foreign policy implementation. He travels extensively, twice
presenting the Austrian case on the South Tyrol dispute with
Italy before the General Assembly of the United Nations. His
speeches are statements of considerable importance. Because
of his political philosophy, he has be in subjected to muc
criticism from the People* s Party. It has been argued that a
Socialist cannot properly support the talks under progress
with the European Economic Community. The Socialists* rebut-
tal maintains that he has conducted foreign policy matters
entirely on the basis of the jointly reached cabinet deci-
sions. The Foreign Minister has declared that "joining the
Common Market must be subordinated to other diplomatic and
9political conisderations." A bitter struggle followed which
saw the Foreign Minister retain his position but lose the
responsibility for these negotiations to the Trade Ministry.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Under the direction of the Foreign Minister, the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs is res onsible for the administra-
tion and execution of foreign affairs. The implementation of
policy is carried out through n ial diplomatic channels ax;
9
"Political Discord Over Foreign Policy,"








the growing personal contacts between the Chancellor, For-
eign Minister, and hiqh government officials and their
counterparts abroad. This latter .intact is strengthened by
official visits to and from other countries, and through
active participation in international organizations such as
the United Nations* While t, two fcey positions are filled
with political appointees, . amainder are reserved for
Foreign Service Officers and areer civil servants. The For-
eign Service is an instrument of the Government and does not
formulate policy though advice is often solicited by the
ctecis ion-makers. Public res visibility for Austria* s foreign
policy is that of the Government and Foreign Minister.
There are approximately three hundred fully-accredited
Foreign Service Officers, each having completed the required
graduate studies. About 40 per cent serve in Vienna, whe-
other states maintain thirty embassies and sixteen legations.
The remainder of the Foreign Service is distributed throughout
the world* The selection of a chief of mission or ambassa
is generally from among these diplomats, although occasionally
politics dictate the selection. The rotation rate insures
that every officer will serve at least thr^e lon^ trs in
Vienna, but tht re is no stablished career plan or procedure
to reach the
In the areas of intelligence and planning, no hard
facts were obtained other than several vague notions*
MflMPOi td XA kH < •;: fit
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Apparently, there is no absolute standard by which to meas-
ure the acceptance of intelligence in planning. It varies
according to the issue and the experience of the Foreign Min-
ister in dealing with the particular problem. It is assumed
that Dr. Kreisky personally evaluates reports from the vari-
ous collectors and uses the information with selectivity.
There are several personnel practices of interest.
First, entrance into the Foreign Service is competitive and
awarded to the ''best suited." Second, the first three pro-
motions which cover roughly a ten-year period are automatic.
Advancement is not guaranteed after these, and the indivi-
dual's ability becomes the basis for further promotions.
Foreign Service Officers were dedicated and a sen
of profession was highly developed despite low remuneration.
Recently, there has been a trend toward greater mobility in
the higher echelons , as industry provided attractive oppor-
tunities. While this situation has been recognised by public
leaders, nothing has heen advanced to improve the economic
position of these officers. On the other hand. Foreign Serv-




The Austrian Parliament is bicameral. It is composed
of the Nationalrat
s









Upper House. In general, the two chambers meet separately,
although there are specific matters of special Importance
that require them to meet jointly. This is known as a Bun-
dlesversammlung , which can only be convened by the President.
A declaration of war and administration of the oath of
office to the President require such a joint meeting.
The Nationalrat has by far the greater power of t
two in most matters, including foreign policy. It inltiat
all legislation. Draft laws are submitted to the Nationalrat
as either motions of its members, or as bills of the Federal
vernment. It is through this latter method that the Bundes-
rat can submit its proposals. A new bill starts in the Lower
House and is usually given three readings. If approved, it
is sent by its President to the Chancellor, who must send it
to the Bundesrat. This House may temporarily hold up legis-
lation with its suspensive veto power, but cannot outright
veto it. If approved by the Bundesrat, the legislation is
submitted to the Federal President by the Chancellor for au-
thentication. If the measure is not approved, it i3 resub-
mitted to the Nationalrat. If approved once again, by a
majority with at least 50 per cent of the membership present,
10it becomes law with the President *s signature. There are
165 delegates to the Nationalrat, of which 81 are members of
the People* s Party, 76 are Socialists, and the remaining
Peaslee, op . cit
. ,
p. 119.
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number belong to the Freedom Party, They normally serve
terms of four years, since it is stipulated in the Constitu-
tion that the legislative period may not exceed this period
in length.
The Duncesrat is also referred to as the Federal
Council sad is representative of the provincial governments.
It consists of fifty delegates selected by the provincial
authorities, on the basis of population in each province.
The delegates serve during the life of the provincial govern-
m • ich they represent.
Summary
The Nationalrat has the greater authority and is the
main forum. It has the important function of approving all
treaties , although it does not have confirmation rs o\ .
ambassadorial appointments. The Nationalrat initiat
legislation and ta .ndesrat gives its consent,
e effectiveness of Austria's foreign policy rests
:tially on the government's ability to maintain peaceful
relations with all neighboring states, Austrian policies
and actions in Europe and in international organizations c:
discussed in Chapter VIII to determine the extent of




In the development and execution of a successful
foreign policy, a number of variable external factors must
be carefully evaluated by responsible decision-makers.
Relations with particular states often have a disproportion-
ate impact upon the entire foreign policy process. The
degree of friendliness or hostility between neighboring
states affects political judgments* Trade patterns, mili-
tary postures, and commitments to regional and global
organizations must also be considered. These factors were
analyzed, beginning with Austrian relations with her neigh-
boring states.
I. RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STAT;
Austria has six European neighbors, including two
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and two
of the Warsaw Pact* In the case of the NATO states, the
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, the interaction with
Austria is of intense proportions. This tends to link the
Austrian economy to that of Western Europe and y primarily,
to the countries of the European Economic Community. The
relationship with the Warsaw Pact members is less signifi-





a collective grouping of other Eastern European states. A
general outline of the Austrian trade pattern with the
majority of her neighbors may be found in Table II, infra
,
p. 168.
Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany is a aber of the
EEC and a major link in the defense of Western Europe
against any possible Communist aggression. This is founded
on Germany's strategic location, military assets, and indus-
trial capacity. While the Federal Republic is deeply com-
mitted to NATO
s
she is extremely friendly toward neutral
Austria. The German Government is actively supporting the
Austrian application for Associate Membership in the
The Federal Republic of Germany is the country's
major customer and supplier of imports. As is shown in
Table II, Germany accounted for over 42 per cent of her
imports and 28 per cent of her exports in 1962. Never in
Austrian history has there been such de ice upon one
national market. In 1937, Germany was then also her prin-
cipal trading partner, although this only amounted to 16 per
cent of her imports and 15 per cent of her exports.
S« E« H. Daw, writing for the British Government in





Economic and Commercial Conditions in Austria 1957 makes the
following observations
There are many reasons for this volume, such as
a common frontier, and a common language as well
as many similar cultural interests; and freight
charges on German goods are lower than th m
the United Kingdom and France* The common language
facilitates correspondence and the availability of
trade literature. The close contact of industrial-
ists during the war years also created a link in
technical matters which has persisted* To these
advantages must be added the determination on ti.
part of Germany to exploit the Austrian market to
the utmost. Ho effort has he&n spai
this end* This effort is evident in the participa-
tion of German firms in tr. airs in Ai. a and
in the considerable volume of advertising in Austrian
trade publications*
2
In June 1961, the Federal Republic and Austria signed
an agreement for the indemnification of Austrians p rated
by the Nazis* With this payment made, the last major for-
eign policy controversy was settled and harmonious relations
have since prevailed* Germany annually receives a vital
surplus from this Austrian -trade, which is centered in the
exchange of industrial goods. In return, Austria benefits
from the proximity of German markets, which helps to hold
the unfavorable transportation costs to a minimum level.
Furthermore, outside of Trieste, her overseas exports are
shipped principally from the German North Sea ports of
Hamburg and Bremen*
2S* E. H* DAW, Economic and Commercial Conditions in



















Italy is Austria's second most important trading
partner. Like the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy is a
full member of the European Economic Community, while main-
taining cordial relations with Austria, Trade is centered
around the exchange of Austrian lumber and steel for Italian
agricultural products. This results annually in a favorable
balance of payments for Austria, While this is a signifi-
cant relationship for both countries, it is complicated by
an unresolved foreign policy issue, which has he^n a per-
sistent external concern to both governments. This is t:
matter of regional autonomy for the region formerly known as
the South Tyrol,
Italy initially received this Austrian region as a
secret reward for joining the alliance against Germany and
Austria-Hungary in the First World War,"* The majority a
the population in this area spoke German and consider*
themselves an integral part of the Austrian nation. Con:.
quently, the Austrian Government has held this award to be a
flagrant violation of the ^ilsonian principle oi self-
determination .
3
: : the details of the secret London Agreement of
April 26, 1915, see A. J. P, Taylor, The Struggle for
/.astery in Europe 1848-1918 (London: Oxford University





The Austrian case for regional autonomy is based
further on the grounds that while Austria was a victim of
Nazi aggression, Italy was the defeated partner of the
Germans* The Austrian Government presented its first post-
war appeal of the original award at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence in early 1946, which decided the terms of the Italian
Peace Treaty. Nevertheless, for political reasons, ti
Conference of Foreign Ministers again rejected all Austrian
claims on April 30, 194G. However, the Italian Government,
in a memorandum to the Foreign Ministers, promised to grant
to the German-speaking population in the South Tyrol a large
measv administrative autonomy as well as measures to
safeguard their unique interests. The South Tyrolean were
granted *j tary and secondary education in German, parity
of Germans with Italians in public offices, and more civil
service opportunities* In this situation, an agreement for
the protection of the ethnic and cultural character of the
Austrian minority in Italy was signed by former Austrian
reign Minister Gruber and the Italian Prime Minister De
Gasperi on September 5, 1946* It has haen in the execution
of that accord which has he<d.n the source of friction between
the two governments.
In January 1948, Rome established an autonomous
region that included not only Bozan Province, once known as
the South Tyrol, but also the Italian-speaking Trento
io













Province to the south* This had the effect of making the
German-speaking majority in Bosen Province into a minority
with 220,000 German speakers swamped by 510 t 000 Italian-
speakers • Naturally, the Austrian Government has supported
the German minority who claim that their basic rights have
heen violated,
The Austrians took the matter to the United Nations
only after bilateral negotiations with the Italian Government
had proved unfruitful. The Austrian authorities have made
it clear that they have no territorial ambitions in tl
Brenner area. The Government considered that only
implementation of regional autonomy for t; 'yrol
would genuinely fulfill the terms of feh<
between the two countries an ~he issue.
The significance of this long-standing issue has h®en
its internal uniting effect in Austri 6 a
constant challenge and the incentiv ,.rk together to
make a stronger state* Finally, a separat . vision was
creat-. thin the Political Section of tfe i istry for
Foreign Affairs to handle ther jotiations, along with
other minority questions.
Yugoslavia
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Austrian relations with Yugoslavia are cool but
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but correct. In November 1960, the Austrian Government
satisfied all Yugoslav claims which resulted from the Second
World War. Two major issues remain open which prevent the
restoration of a more cordial atmosphere between the two
governments. The first matter concerned the Austrian claims
for compensations of former Austrian properties nationalized
in Yugoslavia. On the Yugoslav side was official dissatis-
faction with the position of the Slovene minority which
resides in Cathinia. Until these two matters are solved,
relations are likely to remain in the current state.
II. INTEREST IN EUROPEAN COOPERATION
Austrian interest in European integration is three-
fold. First, there is the histox'ical experienc ... '.ch
supports this movement. Second, the Austrian economy
export oriented in the direction of Western Europe* Finally,
many prominent citizens, including Professor Nemschak,
believe that without Austrian integration into the larger
European market, the Second Republic will ultimately lot
its political independence, despite its proclaimed permanent
neutrality.
Background
The beginning of Austrian participation in an Euro-









years to when Freiherr von Bruck, an Austrian Minister of
Commerce, tried to organize such a community. Later, an
economic union was established within the framework of the
Austro-Kungarian Empire, which constituted a large economic
community. Besides Austria, it included Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and portions of modern Rumania, Yugoslavia and
Poland. The Empire was consolidated over decades and came
close to being autarkical in food production. The southern
and eastern districts were predominantly agricultural; the
northern and western districts industrial, thus forming
close to an ideal economic unit.
When the Hapsburg Monarchy collapsed in the autumn of
1913, the bulk of its territories and population wa3 trans-
ferred to the so-called Succession States, along with its
main sources of food supply and vital coal resources. Trade
barriers and other restrictions to international commerce-
were immediately erected against one another which destroyed
the earlier commercial ties. This initial disruption of
trade resulted in Austrian commerce being shifted from these
traditional markets to Western Europe, a trend that has
intensified since the conclusion of the Second World War.
During the existence of the First Republic, Austria
exported about 28 per cent of her total exports to states
5Richard Kiscocks , The Rebirth of Austria ( London
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in Eastern Europe, Under normal conditions, Polish and
Czechoslavakian coal would be a natural exchange for Austrian
6
oil. The. Soviet occupation of the Eastern European coun-
tries in the postwar period was a severe shock to the
already weakened economy, as Austrian foreign capital invest-
ments in that region were confiscated and trade impaired.
Whereas in 1937, 28 per cent of her exports and 32 per cent
of her imports were with these states; in 1962, the respec-
tive figures were only 14 .8 per cent and 11 per cent.
With the exception of Poland and the Soviet Union,
this trade with Eastern Europe is favorable to Austria,
giving to it an overall export surplus. The difficulty with
this relationship has been that these Communist states are
unable to supply food and coal, vital Austrian imports, in
exchange for Austrian products. Again, this illustrates the
extent to which traditional trading patterns have be^n dis-
rupted, and why a relative and absolute increase in Western
European trade may be continued.
Austria's foreign trade was non-existent in 1945.
Host of the large industrial complexes were greatly impaired
because of extensive damage, confiscations, changes in eco-
7
nomic aims, and an acute shortage of capital. All
6Ibid
., p. 234.
Franz Heissenberger, The Economic Reconstruction of
Austria 1945-1952 (Washington: Library of Congress, 195 377
p. 63.
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commercial arrangements had to be restored, and the new
political reality of Communist supremacy in Eastern Europe
had to be dealt with.
In the immediate postwar period, the traffic in goods
was restricted mainly to the nearest neighboring countries,
K. W. Rothschild, in The Austrian Economy Since 1945 points
out that:
In August 1945, the first barter agreement was signed
with Hungary, to be followed by one with Czechoslo-
vakia, and later with Italy and Switzerland. These
barter agreements were restricted to specific ex-
changes of limited quantities of goods. By the end
of 1945 thirty-one such specific agreements had been
concluded .
8
These agreements were followed by Austrian participation in
the European Payments Union, which enabled her to expand
trade to more distant areas on the basis of multilateral
agreements. By 1950, foreign trade had expanded over pr
war figures and has continued to maintain a steady growth
ever since.
At first, imports consisted mainly of foreign relief
consignments, which in 1945 and 1946 accounted for about 88
per cent of total imports. By 1954, this percentage had
shrunk to only 3 per cent, and since then foreign relief has
g
not played any part in Austria* s foreign trade balance.
8
K. W. Rothschild, The Austrian Economy Since 1945
(London: Oxford University Press, 1950 )', p. 23.










The United States provided through fiscal year 1953 about
$1,3 billion in many forms; such as, machinery, industrial
raw materials, food and money. United States assistance
to the tourist industry, which is the country's greatest
earner of foreign exchange, was particularly fortunate.
Since 1953, no United States economic grant aid has been
given to Austria except for very small annual technical
exchanges and a productivity program.
Participation in European Organizations
While normally a state 1 s growing involvement in world
trade is accompanied by a v/ider geographical distribution of
its outlets, the postwar political stalemate forced Austrian
exports in the direction of a definite Western regional con-
centration • As an indirect result of this circumstance,
Austria became a charter member of the Organisation for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation. Even before this action, the
Austrian Government was clearly in favor of European unity:
In October 1945, before the European movement had
been fully launched by Churchill 1 s great speeches
at Brussels, The Hague, and Zurich, Leopold Figl,
who was not yet Chancellor, wrote of Austria as a
News item in The New York Times . March 30, 1961*
11United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Special Study Hission to Poland and Austria , 37a>










"germ-cell" in the reconstruction of the European
community of peoples. Xn one of his first speeches
to the National Assembly the following December he
spoke of the vital importance of instilling into
the rising generation of Austrians an "all-European
democratic way of thought." Austria was subsequently
represented at the Congress of Europe at The Hague
in 1948, and at the meetings of the European Parlia-
mentary Union. 12
Next, Austria joined the Council of Europe in April 1956.
Although membership in this consultative organisation re-
quired little of Austria, the significance of this act was
her detachments from the historic ties mentioned earlier
with the countries in the Danube Basin.
Austria became a member of the European Nuclear
Energy Agency, which was established within the framework of
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation in Decem-
ber 1957. Together with the European Economic Community
countries, who represent six of the eighteen European mem-
bers, Austria is contributing financial resources to several
joint projects. The government desired to expand this
limited cooperation into a broader understanding with
EURATOM.
In 1958, attempts by the British Government to group
all members of the Organization for European Economic Coop-
eration into a single Free Trade Area proved unsuccessful.
12
1 Robert T. Bower (dir.), Communications and Public
Opinion in Austria {Washington t Bureau of 3ociaT"3cience
Research, The American University, 1954), p. 2
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With the subsequent formation of the European Free Trade
Association, Austria Joined this group on January 4, 1960.
Even at this occasion, Austria was looking ahead toward the
merger of the European Free Trade Association and European
Economic Community into a single market, Following the
United Kingdom 1 s decision to apply for full membership in
the Common Market, Austria announced in July 1961 her inten-
tion to seek association with that organization. Chancellor
Gorbach asserted in the Government Declaration that:
We believe that in acting in this manner we shall
support and adhere to our established policy of
military neutrality. On the other hand, v/e shall
take full advantage of our freedom of choice to
participate to the fullest in economic integration
efforts because we are convinced that this is fully
compatible with our special position. 13
The economic connections with the European Trade Asso-
ciation and the European Economic Community were analysed
in Chapter IV.
III. AUSTRIA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
United Nations
In addition to the European organizations cited above,
Austria belongs to numerous international groupings, includ-
ing the United Nations. Austria joined this latter organiza-
tion on December 15, 1955, after a long wait caused by the





unwillingness of the Soviet Government to withdraw from
14Austria and to agree to a State Treaty. After its admis-
sion, Austria became an active member and was represented
on seven commissions of the united Nations in 1964.
Austria has usually sided with the Western members in
voting on major international issues. For example, at the
Sixteenth General Assembly Session, there were 114 roll call
votes on which the United States and the Soviet Union took
opposing positions, Francis 0. Wilcox, writing in the
summer of 1963, pointed out that
Austria's vote coincided with that of the United
States on 72 occasions ,15
In addition, Austria abstained thirty-two times leaving but
ten roll call vot an the national interests of Austria
were divergent of the Unit One sou-
of disagreement with the United States has h&en over the
proposed membership of Communist China*, gn Minister
Kreisky remarked in November 1963 that Austria would not
l
-
The Soviet Union finally broke the deadlock in the
Security Council by agreeing to the Austrian accession,
along with fifteen other applicant states. The other states
whose applications were approved included: Albania, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordon,
Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania, and Spain.
15Francis 0, Wilcox, "The Atlantic Community and the





object to this admission. The Austrian Government has
consistently abstained in recent United Nations votes on
this question.
There have been many indications of Austrian interest
in the tasks of the United nations. In December 1960, the
Austrian Government sent their first detachment of medical
personnel to the troubled Congo. This group was augmented
in the following year, and a total of 112 individuals served
in that United Nations peace action* In 1962, the Govern-
17
ment subscribed $900,000 to pur-chase United Nations bonds.
Later in that same year, Austria contributed $500,000 in
commodities to the United Nations World Food Program. In
the 1964 peace action of the United Nations on Cyprus,
Austria enhanced its prestige by sending another medical
unit of fifty-four physicians and a group of thirty-one
Austrian civilian policemen.* On April 2, 1964, the gov-
ernment decided that Austria would, in addition, pay $40,000
as a voluntary contribution to help defray the costs of the
UN-Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus.
News item in Arbeiter-Zeitu . .ovember 20, 19;..
17
* Austrian Information (April 14, 1962), 2.
1 A
Au .a Information (May 1, 1964), 2«
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19United Nations Press Services, Of iblic
Information, Press Release 5G/SK/56 CYP/30, April 3, 1964,
"Text of Letter from Austria to Secretary-
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Austria is a member in good standing in the following
agencies* the International Labor Organization, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, World Health Organization, Food and
Agricultural Organization, UNESCO, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, International Finance
Corporation , International Development Association, Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, International Tele-
communication Union, Universal Postal Union, World
Meteorological Organization, and the International Atomic
Energy Organization. The seat of t .ist-named body is
located in Vienna. Furthermore, Austria is a member of the
World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, and a
contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Austrians also participate in a number of inter-
national non-governmental organizations 5 such as, the Trade
Union Advisory Committee, the Business and Industrial
Advisory Committee, and the International Chamber of Com-
merce, Membership in the preceding organizations, which is
by no means a complete listing of all the ones that the
nation participates ^.n, is highly indicative of the extent
of active Austrian involvement on the international scene.
Aid to Developing Nations
Although the amount is modest, Austria is n, m-
tributing on a selective basis to the developing nation-









to the World Bank as an indirect contribution to the fur-
therance of international development aid. On November 24,
1962, India and Austria signed an agreement providing a $5
million credit to India for th© purchase of Austrian goods
20
required for India 1 s third Five-Year Plan, This was suc-
ceeded by another loan to India in December 1963. Fifteen
projects have b&en approved by the Austrian Government in
1964, It was reported in the SPTA Reporter that:
A large proportion of the $228,000 earmarked for
these projects will go into planning of the Lang-
Sun power plant in Thailand, and toward the
erection of a special steel mill at Tlalenpantle,
<ico.
The program also includes construction of u
and tourist resort at Halam-Jaba, Pakistan, and
equipping a school of^veterinary medicine at Ankara
University in Turkey. 21
It is significant to i . re that a i ate division was
created within th.. L.itical .istry for
Foreign Affairs to handle t projects.
It has been shown that Austrian interests are not
confined to ut ra; } e* This involve-
ment in international institutions must be considered by
Austrian policy-mak awl care exercised not to jeopardize
the military neutrality. Along with this, -makers
must heed the general public acceptance of the need to
:
v l:. u, ;...• •.:•.. .,:,,. ,,Atlpa (February 23, 1963). 3.
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-vjft Reporter (March 5, 1964), 2.
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continuously seek further measures of regional and inter-
national understanding.
(it ba& l& 3 ft02u«*£tfB lsri^xuS ***>« .:l$ur
CHAPTSR IX
CONCLUSIONS
The varied dimensions of the Austrian foreign policy
process have be in this study. These have in-
cluded the political process, institutional framework, and
the international environment. In many cases, the impact of
ase factors was found to be Ir, as the per*
ial relationships ' i key public officials involved in
foreign affairs and those not directly connect th govern-
ment service. However, it was only when all t liverse
elements were synthesized and collectively considered that
the total framework of the foreign policy process was estab-
lished. It was hoped that this inquiry has produced a
comprehensive analysis of the Austrian model.
Transformation in Society
Great changes in the society and state have been
observed. This transformation of value judgments has
transferred to politics, where moderation has superseded the
former hostility and inflexibility of politicans and party
platforms. The extent of Austrian involvement in world
affairs and international organisation, as described in the
preceding chapter , was further proof of the new confident
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of the people and national leaders in the future of Austria*
In their search for national security and identity, the
Austrian people have achieved unity, prosperity, and inde-
pendence. Finally, the observance of a strict military
neutxality has become the cornerstone of Austria 1 s foreign
policy and the foundation of the Second Austrian Republic,
Foreign Policy Process
The actual process of policy formulation, which was
of a subsurface nature in the Coalition Committee, has
developed differently than that
the Constitution. While the Chancellor was the : influ~
ential official in the overall process, even his role an
authority were overshadowed by the complete domination of
the two major political parties. The coalition practice and
i-roporz have tended to promote static leadership and com-
promised policies, which are not easy to chang
The remarkable consistency of Austria's t >n
policy has h&&n noted. The best way to summari, ;ent
developments in Austria's foreign policy was to say that it
has met its responsibility of maintaini ^ary neutrality
bh limited resources. The Austrians have made significant
progress toward building a modern defense force to comple-
ment this policy.
One cannot help but arrive at the conclusion that
xnolSaa bo* alqoa** i




Austrians want more than their neutralised status permits,
despite official pronouncements to the contrary. In their
bid for a special treaty and Associate Membership in the
copean Economic Community, one finds a basic contradic-
tion. Although this relationship is expounded by Austrian
political leaders to be vital, they also insist that nothing
must be allowed to impair the neutral status of the country.
Yet, there are clear political implications in the 1958
Treaty of Rome. What will happen in Austria If the members
of the Suro; Economic Community decide not to approve the
pendir* 3 cation: The prospects of the British applica-
tion to that same organization appeared much better, but
unilateral French action blocked that petition. The. Aus-
trian application has already brought forth opposition on
several grounds, including the argument that neutrally
states e. ..ambers would severely weaken the possibility
of attaining those same political objectives. It is appar-
ent that some realistic adjust*", to accommo-
date boi itions and that the Austrian nation must be
pr i denial to their
aspirat.. . :tion with tl t«
As rard change is the
continued di ..:ent writl status quo in th m of
the for.. ith Tyrol* As described, th< . ad





German minority. The problem exists whether the government
will continue to plead Its case in the United Nations, with-
draw support and abandon the German minority, or adopt more
active measures to insure that regional autonomy is achieved.
Outlook
The existing bipartisan governmental structure has
been endorsee by the Austrian electorate in / postwar
election. In the eyes of this observer, there is every
indication of a genuine political consensus among the nation*
There s no tangible ©vide i might
take an extreme position in changing the government, but
discontent within the national community has grown . An end
to the Coalition can be f01 :.>ugh not b i*ext
national e on, and a return made tc bhat is
truly competitive. This would stimulate the memi- Lp in
the political parties, the economy, and the nation. It
would likely result in some shifts in the foreign policy
process, since the actions of government would be more
closely linked with, c sponsive to, the electorate.
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29,782 73.8 22,287 67.8
5,270 13.1 4,948 15.2
23,898 59.2 16,427 50.0
4,4 11.0 76 14.8
3,442 5 2,169 6.6
2,2 5«6 1,273 3.9
755 1.9 12
987 2.5 1,449 4.4
217 0.5 233 0.7
0.8
•Not including Finland or Yugoslavia*
SOURCE : Austr
( Vienna : Economic 3
1963), p. 14.
•ian Economy in Figures , Year 19S2
spartmeht: or cTediranstalt-Bankverein
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FOREIGN TRADE WITH EEC AND EFTA COUNTRIES 1962
168
MOMMM .a' ixxrnssa mamm m
Imports *• x>rts





Norway . . . .
riugal . • •








Netherlands • • «
Total
373 0, 449 1.4
2,039 5.1 3 2.9
:s 0.5 313 1.0
. 0.2 105 0.3
1 • 8X4 2.5




17,071 t.3 9,177 2.
3,302 8.2 5,0 15.3
717 1.8 Dl 1.5
1,554 3.9 18 2.1
1,254 3.1 1,026 3.1
23,898 >.3 16,427 .0
BsaBTH.iiH if ' ', I, 1 1 t ,i"i lrm. i,u i . m. i l riTi l |.,iMi i,i iu i ,i j.j^hm,1 i" mnn i m sacs
•Share in the total volume of Austria »s foi - trade.
ray irSOUR.









PORSIGH TRADE WITH COMMUNIST STATES 1962
Percentage of Percentage of
Total Imports Total Exports
Bulgaria » * 1*1
Czechoslovakia » • • . . 1*6 2*4
Eastern Germany • • * « 1*2 1.2
Hungary «•«*».*•« 2*0 2*2




Soviet Union ****** 2.8 4.3
Yugoslavia ******* 1.6 2*7
.;>t@rn Europe 72*5 65.3
:::ix^aaa.' l | .T.'ii llli: i!i,i l r, l ,i l '.:r'T ,':;g,r:,7:,i ll j, ^^.j!,!. nt i XiiWi.i li rrriULa!XvmTr^a^^
•Statistical data not available.
SOURCE : Statistical Data on Austria £&itioa jl
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